Alabama's Railroad Network: 1830-1870

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In 1830, a charter to build a railroad connecting Decatur and Tuscumbia was requested of the Alabama legislature, in order to "overcome the obstruction to trade caused by the Muscle Shoals of the Tennessee River." Two years later, a charter was granted to Tuscumbia, Courtland and Decatur Railroad; by the latter part of 1834 the line had been completed. Operations on this first railroad were hardly what many of us today would think. The great "iron horse," with its puffing smokestack did not appear on the line until 1835 or 1836; during the first few months the cars were pulled by mule rather than steam power.

Despite the fact that this first Alabama venture in railroading had cost an estimated $5,000 per mile to complete, a cost which "proved very burdensome to an agricultural population," the race was on. In 1832 the Montgomery Railroad Company became the second line to receive a charter to connect Montgomery with West Point, Georgia. Nothing more was done on this line until October, 1835, when subscription for the capital stock was begun and "within a few days . . . a total subscription of $849,000" toward an estimated cost of $900,000 was subscribed.

A third line to connect Montgomery and Mobile had many of the subscribers to stock from the port
city. The Board of Directors in February, 1836, requested an installment of five dollars for every share of capital stock in order to let contracts for the first forty-mile section of the road. When stockholders did not deliver the money, the company declared that unless this money was received by April 20, 1836, all those not complying would forfeit their stock; by December 21, 1836, however, the money had not yet been received. By March, 1837, "12 or 14 miles of track had been graded," and only sixty additional miles had been placed "under contract." During 1839, it "became evident to the authorities that to complete the road state aid must be obtained." On April 8, 1840, aid was granted, and by November 10, 1840, the road was completed to Franklin.

Alabama's first decade in railroad development (1830-1839) can be characterized as one of increasing interest in railroads, with relatively few actual miles of road built. Over twenty-five charters were issued but most remained mere ideas. It should be noted, however, that the Panic of 1837 was a hindrance in the late 1830's and early 1840's. Progress was made, but it was very slow.

The decade of the 1840's was a lean period for Alabama's railroads. Only seven new charters were issued and little construction was done, largely because of the depression. Only one thing of much importance occurred during these years: the beginning of state aid to railroads. The aid given to the Montgomery and West Point line was a precedent in Alabama; one which, with the passage of time and greater use by other states and the federal government, Alabama would use again. It was from this time that "there developed a strong feeling among the people that the state should render some positive aid to improvements of this character." And it was this desire for state aid which eventually played a major
role, not only in establishing Alabama's railroad network, but in determining when it would be established.

The third decade of Alabama railroad building from 1850-1859 was one of the most important. This period saw state internal improvements, intense political attempts to unite the state through railroads and legislative concern to develop the state's resources. When the decade opened Alabama had a total of 132.5 miles of railroads; the Tuscumbia and Decatur had forty-four miles and the Montgomery and West Point had eighty-eight and one half. This situation, however, changed quite rapidly.

Earlier a clamor had arisen for state intervention and aid to railroads. There was a growing desire to unite the northern and southern parts of the state with a railroad. At Talladega, in 1849, a railroad convention considered this possibility in its deliberations. Leroy P. Walker of Huntsville told the legislature about some of the benefits to be achieved by state aid to railroads: "... I blush to say that in many parts of the State of Alabama it is still as slow and onerous as it was in Great Britain before that triumph of modern genius, the locomotive, was first seen...!" "Sir," he continued, "I stand here today to contend for the patronage by the State of Alabama of a system in which I believe the best interests of the Commonwealth and the prosperity of her people are alike profoundly involved." He dramatically concluded:

If Alabama... does not take measures to urge forward, I will not say a liberal and comprehensive, but a necessary system of public improvements, developing the rich and varied resources of her soil, and connecting herself by links of iron with the railroads of other States, she must not only decline in strength and prosperity, but eventually recede to a state of worse than colonial (sic.) vassalage; whilst all around her, on every side, will roll those vivifying
waters of energy and enterprise which, denied all access (sic.) here, have gone to gladden other regions, and to make the distant wilderness blossom like the rose. 15

These early attempts at internal improvements were, for the most part, unsuccessful. In 1848, the Alabama Congressional delegation had "unanimously opposed" a railroad bill granting federal and state aid to railroads. Two years later United States Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois went to Mobile and conferred with the directors of a Mobile railroad company whose road had failed for lack of financial support. A coalition of Alabamians and Mississippian's secured the passage of a law in 1850 making the Mobile and Ohio part of the Illinois Central system. Thus the southern states were connected by rail with the Great Lakes, with part of the road passing through Alabama. 16

However strong the precedent of the Mobile and Ohio, and the desire of men like Walker for a state railroad network, it was not strong enough at this time to create aid to railroads in general. In 1851, the Internal Improvements Convention, speaking of railroads and state aid, noted that "... save for the application of a portion of the Internal Improvements fund appropriated by Congress for the purpose, this state has given no encouragement to the construction of railways within her borders. . . ." Other states, however, had "... recognized the wisdom of the policy of contributing to assist the completion of their railroad improvements, and the results have (sic., have) fully vindicated the propriety of their decision." 17 But 1851 saw absolutely no new railroad construction in Alabama.

Continuing development and renewed interest after 1851 saw an increase in mileage each year. Between the time the first road was completed in 1834 until 1851, only 132 1/2 miles of track had been laid. But in 1852, Alabama built 28.5 miles, raising the total to 161 miles.
Through 1860 the increase in railroad mileage continued. This vast expansion produced 610.66 miles of railroad in Alabama in a single decade, and gave the state a total mileage of 743.16: an increase of 461 per cent. Between 1850 and 1859 seventy-three charters were issued by the state. The 1860 census also noticed this increase in southern railroad building, although it did not refer specifically to Alabama. "The southern states have been behind the northern in their public enterprises," it reported, "though, at the date of the census, they were prosecuting them with great energy and vigor."18

ALABAMA'S RAILROAD MILEAGE, 1851-1860*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>None</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>114.76</td>
<td>743.16</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

* Source: See Footnote 20.

This increase in mileage, however, was not easily achieved. The development and acceptance of state aid to railroads in Alabama was a process of evolution, not an "over-night" development. The Internal Improvement Convention of 1851 had given a rhetorical but unconvincing argument, at least for most of the people in the state. Although the proposal and recommendations of the convention sounded good, the legislature did not comply. William Martin's study, pub-
lished in 1902, gives five reasons for this. (1) The state bank had recently failed, causing a collapse in the state's finances, which had not been reversed; yet "taxation was still high . . . and many (people were) . . . ready to oppose any measure which threatened a higher tax rate." (2) Also due to the bank failure, "confidence in the integrity or ability of the state as an undertaker" of enterprises was lacking. (3) Many residents of Alabama during this time were concerned with Alabama in an exploitive rather than a developmental sense, and actually had the Far West as their ultimate objective for a "home." "This element acted as a check to the spirit of internal improvements . . ." (4) There were sectional disputes within the state. And (5) many Alabamians felt that this use of taxation was unconstitutional and should be left to private capital. 19

In 1853 and 1855 the gubernatorial races were fought over the issue of state aid, with the Democratic candidate, John A. Winston, opposed to such assistance. The Democrats won both elections and although the legislators tried to aid railroad construction, their attempts were frustrated by the executive branch. Winston vetoed thirty-three such acts and has since been referred to in Alabama as the "Veto Governor." 20

Despite his determined stand on the issue of state aid, Winston's years as governor were not barren for railroad development. But the mileage increases were in spite of Winston rather than because of him. By the opening of his second term the demand for state aid was so strong that some railroad bills were passed over his vetoes. In 1855, E. D. Sanford in a report concerning a road connecting the northern and southern parts of the state, to wish that Alabama would give as much aid as Tennessee, which he felt was inadequate. 21

The desire to bring unity between the northern and southern parts of Alabama has been mentioned
earlier, but needs reiteration. Ethel Armes declared that "The northern and southern portions of the State, without a railroad, were two separate and distinct countries. Political, social, industrial, and economic conditions had become gradually tangled into a Gordian knot." Added to this age-old problem of uniting the state was a growing desire in the 1850's to exploit the mineral wealth of Alabama. Horace Mann Bond, in an in-depth study of Alabama during Reconstruction days, stated:

Its (Alabama's) natural resources were unique in the South; and, in an age when Coal was power, and Iron the other necessity for industry, it was already known that the Northern hill-country of Alabama had both in unexampled proximity. The bankers in Philadelphia and New York, and even in London, and Paris, had known this for almost two decades. The only thing lacking was transportation.

But it was not until John T. Milner's report to the state legislature in 1859, that both the uniting of the northern and southern parts of the state, and the exploitation of Alabama's resources were put into a single statement, convincing enough to get necessary state aid to develop a railroad network. This state publication contains an almost irrefutable argument. After reading it, one understands much better Ethel Armes' statement that Milner's "statistics were used generally throughout Alabama by railroad promoters and speakers for the next twenty years." Milner's desire for a north-south railroad was so acute that he prepared a highly detailed report on the advantages and disadvantages of six conceivable routes between the northern (Decatur) and southern (Montevallo) termini of the road.

Some of his statements show the importance he placed on Alabama's railroad development. It was his belief that the proposed railroad
occupies the most important position for the people of Alabama of any enterprise that ever came before them. They have thought and talked over the connection of South and North Alabama, and the development of their mineral wealth for forty years or more, but until the recent survey was made, it has always been considered impracticable to build a railroad through these mountains at a reasonable cost.

Milner was convinced that Alabama would supply the South, the Gulf States, Central and South America, in time the Pacific Coast, and perhaps the entire Pacific with coal. "Alabama is to the Gulf what Pennsylvania is to the Atlantic States," he declared. "Her coal must drive their ships, their mills, and their machines. The amount needed for ten years to come in all quarters from our mines, is only conjectural. It is not too much to say we will need three hundred thousand tons per annum." He predicted the rewards created for the state by its supply of iron ore, and added that such a network would benefit the development of the state's marble interests and would serve as a shipper of cotton and perishables. All this, in turn, would bring and keep new people and investments in Alabama, raise property values, and generally benefit the entire state, he predicted.

In a reference to Alabamians Milner said: "I know the people of Alabama are opposed to state aid. They have suffered from banks and have not very judiciously managed all their trust funds." Later in the report he added that "it is hard for a man who has lived in Alabama seven years to account for the deep and widespread suspicion and want of confidence in such investments. There seems to be a holy horror, so to speak, of all railroad corporations." Advocating a needed change in attitudes of the citizens, he stated that money in dribblets, to internal improvements, is like throwing sand in a river, or a handful of snow into a volcano. It affects no good, but is spirited away, and
not even a trace of it is left. Such, unfortunately, has been the condition of every work of internal improvement within our State, whether public or private, until very late years. In the beginning our Railroads were attempted to be built with promises, with hopes, with anything but money. Their sudden destruction, when the storm weather came, has given to people all over the State, a doubt upon the subject that is hard to remove. 27

Using a series of charts to support his argument showing a gain in state wealth, he convincingly said that "it is pretty generally conceded now that the incidental benefits of the Railway equal and often exceed its first cost, and it is therefore desirable to bring every honorable argument to bear to induce their construction." 28

In 1860, the state legislature "passed the law adopting Milner's recommendations as to the route and granting a loan of $663,135, 'on condition that the entire line be graded and prepared for iron by the end of five years." In the fall of 1860 a company was organized, with Milner as chief engineer, to begin the monumental task. A worse time for beginning such a project could not have been chosen. With the secession issue receiving attention, many stockholders of the counties supporting the project "abandoned their interests in the road." 29

Thus, at the outbreak of the Civil War, Alabama was ready to embark on the project to obtain a railroad network. During this third decade the state issued seventy-three charters to railroad companies. The period from 1851 to 1860 had seen a total of 610.66 miles of railroad built, with 210.36, or almost twenty-nine percent of the state's total, having been built in the last two years. Increasingly, Alabamians were moving toward an integrated railroad system. 30 Not only had the amount of mileage increased annually after 1851, but by the latter part of the decade it had
begun to increase almost astronomically. With growing interest and increasing public aid, had it not been for the war, Alabama probably would have completed its railroad network much earlier.

Shortly before the outbreak of the war, the Alabama and Florida Railroad was given an emergency loan of $30,000 to hastily complete the Montgomery to Pensacola line by May 3, 1861. On March 28, 1861, a short line, connecting Tensas (just across the bay from Mobile) and Pollard (on the Alabama and Florida Railroad) was begun. Eight months later, on November 15, five months later than the estimated completion date, this line was completely opened to traffic. Summarizing the energy which went into Alabama's railroads immediately preceding the war, Robert C. Black, III said: "The Alabama Assembly of 1859-60 spewed railroad incorporation acts, while grading parties were making the dirt fly in many parts of the state." 32

While this may have been the case, state priorities had to take a back seat to those of the newly formed Confederate Government. Of greatest importance to the Confederacy were through lines, connecting southern states to facilitate transportation and communication. The South, however, only had two such routes, and only one was complete. One line involved a northerly passage through Corinth, Chattanooga, and Bristol; the second, and unfinished route, ran via Montgomery, Atlanta, Wilmington, and Petersburg. Both ran to Richmond and both ran through Alabama. Thus, Alabama's first priority was to complete the unfinished route, which ran through the central part of the state. The major gap "was between Selma, Alabama, and Meridian, Mississippi. The completion of this link would give an all-rail route from Richmond to Vicksburg, with the exceptions of the short Alabama River steamboat connection between Mont-
gomery and Selma and a four-and-a-half-mile passage on the Tombigbee River near Demopolis. 33

By December, 1861, only twenty-three miles of direct Meridian-Selma line were incomplete. "On December 5, the State of Alabama advanced $40,000 to the . . . company to help push its rails westward." At about this same time, "the idea that the central Confederate authority should render assistance to uncompleted railroads of strategic importance was . . . gaining currency." 34 Not long after this the Confederate Congress appropriated $150,000 for the Selma-Meridian link. The next month it permitted importation of duty free railroad iron for the project, making it possible to complete the road by the end of 1862. 35

One of the primary railroad problems of both the Confederate government and the state, was that of providing equipment, specifically iron. This could have been expected within a society which had as little manufacturing as the South, but the extreme to which it was carried is difficult to comprehend. One historian has noted that "iron and machinery were especially scarce. Before the war these necessities had been supplied from the North: now they must be manufactured or imported from Europe." Furthermore, he stated that "although the roads were now cut off from the Northern foundries . . . no general effort seems to have been made to get supplies elsewhere . . ." At first, the Confederacy tried to obtain supplies from Europe, but "the growing stringency of the blockade and the lack of well-established commercial or credit relations with European firms made this very difficult." 36

Given these equipment problems and the importance of the Selma-Meridian line, the government used what James F. Doster called "cannibalizing" to complete that line. Track and equipment were taken from one line, torn up, and then used where needed most.
This means of obtaining necessary equipment is related by Robert C. Black:

The Cahaba, Marion, & Greensborough, a bankrupt short line which intersected the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad a short distance west of Selma, was found to possess four hundred tons of new iron, plus four hundred kegs of spikes, while on the Montgomery & Eufaula, the building of which had scarcely begun, . . . a substantial hoard of track materials and a brand-new locomotive (was discovered). By the latter part of June . . . (there had been) secured from the Cahaba company 55,367 pounds of spikes, 3,810 pounds of bolts and nuts, 17,636 pounds of fish bars, and 1,276 sections of rail. 37

The only other work on Alabama railroads during the war, of consequence enough to note here, was a proposed extension in 1862 of the Alabama and Tennessee Rivers Railroad from Blue Mountain into northwest Georgia. Eventually a subsidy bill passed the Confederate Congress and specifications were set for the extension. The government requirements were strict but two companies expressed their willingness to accept them. These were the Georgia and Alabama line, and the Alabama and Tennessee Rivers road, the latter building east from Blue Mountain and joining the first line. The following statement is probable indicative of many Southern situations:

A railroad having thus been committed to paper, the contractors at once encountered the standard difficulty with rails and fastenings . . . as the weeks and months went by and the grading gangs pushed forward . . . absolutely no iron was forthcoming. After more than a year, not a bar had been spiked down. There were periodic military pronouncements as to the value of the road, and there occurred more than one discussion as to the suitable sources of rail. But to the end of the war the Rome-Blue Mountain connection never became more than a series of naked cuts and files. 38
Interestingly, little extensive damage seems to have been inflicted on Alabama's railroads during the war, probably because the railroads were far enough away from the major fighting to cut down on the number of destructive raids on them. Thus, the railroads were not constantly changing hands, being raided by one side then destroyed before the controlling army pulled back, and then raided again by the same army. During most of the war Alabama's railroads changed hands only once or not at all. Apparently, only one railroad, the Memphis and Charleston, changed hands often and by 1863 it was controlled by the Union forces. Two north Alabama lines, the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad and part of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, were in better shape than many roads at the end of the war. This was partly because both had been operated and controlled by Federal forces who needed them for their own operations. The Memphis & Charleston, by November 6, 1865, was running trains over the entire main line, with only one break at the Decatur bridge across the Tennessee River. But by July 7, 1866, the entire line was open once again.

The western portion of this line running from Decatur to Memphis was not controlled by the Federal army and was damaged extensively; this was the primary area in which repairs were required. Upon return of the road to the directors on September 11, 1865, there was a gap of "one hundred and fourteen miles almost entirely destroyed, except for the road-bed and iron rails, and they were in very bad condition—every bridge and trestle destroyed, cross-ties rotten, buildings burned, watertanks gone, ditches filled up, and track grown up in weeds and bushes... About forty miles of track was burned, cross-ties entirely destroyed, and rails bent and twisted in such a manner as to require great labor to straighten, and a
large portion of them requiring renewal. For all this destruction, however, it is well to remember that the entire line was repaired and operating, except for one bridge, as early as November, 1865.

The Tennessee and Alabama railroad was entirely controlled by Federal forces and reported much less destruction. On this line the amount of rolling stock owned by the company afforded a better supply of equipment for the road than it had previously.

Two railroads—the Alabama & Tennessee Rivers and the Montgomery & West Point—were heavily damaged when General James Wilson raided Alabama in March, 1865. But two months later the tracks were open, and trains running again. Wilson also hit the Montgomery & West Point line on this raid. The company, however, continued to operate until the capture of West Point and Columbus, and the destruction of its entire rolling stock. Here again, the destruction must have been repaired in a short time. For by June 16, 1865, two months after the raid, the road was again open to regular trains.

When raids such as Wilson's did occur, repairs were made with remarkable speed, and nominal profits obtained. Furthermore, some of the policies adopted in Washington at the end of the war aided these railroads. The government, for example, sold supplies to the lines cheaply and permitted directors to take any equipment they could prove had belonged to their road. Many lines were also given government mail contracts to aid their recovery.

The state's postwar policy became more liberal toward railroads than it was before the war. Citizens, once again, gave the railroads their support, because of the contributions to the future development of the state. Specifically, it was thought that railroads "would encourage agriculture and enable business to take advantage of water power and timber," as well
as "open up the rich mineral resources of the state for development."\textsuperscript{42}

In 1865-66, the Alabama legislature began amending old charters and granting new ones. During the 1866-67 session, "further study was devoted to the status of the state's railroads", and in February, 1867, after increasing "agitation for state aid, the General Assembly passed an 'act to establish a system of internal improvements ...'" Besides this state aid and the existing Federal aid, "additional money for the railroads came from cities and from private subscriptions. Cities that would be served by the lines and private citizens along the route were urged to invest."\textsuperscript{43}

The 1967 legislative act provided for the issuance of state bonds by the railroad, but endorsed by the Governor in set amounts for predetermined mileage. The conclusion generally made is that this situation, added to the "incompetency" of the Governor, created the issuance by the state of bonds worth more than the actual lines. This overcapitalization resulted in necessary adjustments, devaluing certain bond issues, and flat rejection of some claims against the state, so that by 1875 it was forbidden by the new constitution for any "subdivision of the state" to engage in or encourage internal improvements. And, according to William Martin, "thus ended the last chapter in the history of public aid to internal improvements in Alabama."\textsuperscript{44}

Almost every work in print blames this situation on one line, the Northeast and Southwest Alabama Railroad Company. This line was chartered "on December 12, 1853, to construct a railroad from some point on the Southern Railroad, near Marion, Mississippi, through Eutaw, Tuscaloosa, and Elyton, and from there to one of the railroads leading to Knoxville, Tennessee."\textsuperscript{45} In December, 1868, the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad Company was formed by uniting the Northeast and Southwest and the Wills

\textsuperscript{41}
Valley lines. The primary figures in this new company were the Stanton brothers, who had come to Alabama in 1868 from Boston.

This particular line was completed on May 14, 1871. It appears as if all were pleased with the road's progress until "the winter of 1870-71, (when) John Stanton became the object of much Democratic criticism because during the fall, he had contributed to Republican campaign funds." An interesting sidelight to the controversy is that ". . . the Democratic opposition to Stanton was coming mainly from areas of the state which would not benefit from the completion of his road." These attacks increased after January 1, 1971, ". . . on which date he failed to pay the interest due the Alabama and Chattanooga bondholders. A subsequent investigation showed that Stanton had been guilty of fraud in financing his road. This evidence was used by many of the state's Democratic papers to ruin the reputation of both Stanton and the Republican Party."46

At least some mitigating evidence can be found to argue for the Stanton interests. One source noted that the "inexperience and corruption of the radical Republicans" was the primary, but not the only reason for these frauds. The Democrats supported "the acts which made these frauds possible" and "the Democratic owners of railroads appear to have bribed legislators as freely as Stanton bribed them." This same writer also observed that "much of the Democratic opposition to the Alabama and Chattanooga Company resulted from commercial rivalry rather than opposition to the corruption connected with the financing of its construction and (this opposition) was destructive rather than constructive."47 Other light is thrown on the political situation by Horace Mann Bond, who maintained that the state debt to the North and South Railroad, also built in this time, was upheld because it was controlled by Democrats; the Alabama and Chat-
Tanooga's claims were rejected because they were Republican controlled. The general tendency has been to blame the majority of the state's public debt upon post-Civil War railroad building. As Dan Berry indicated "by 1870 the state was in debt for $11,850,000, which was the total par value of bonds loaned and endorsed by the state for railroads." The fraud was pointed out when Berry referred to "a speech given by Governor Smith in 1870, " in which it was ascertained that the state had purchased 642 miles of track through its endorsement of bonds, and that "the state endorsements and loans amounted to over $18,400 per mile." This was some $2,400 per mile over the maximum expenditure permitted by the amended state act of 1867.

Regardless of the degree of corruption, one thing is certain: Alabama's railroads continued to grow in the period from 1865 to 1870. On December 3, 1865, Alabama had two percent of the total railroad mileage in the nation. During the next ten years this mileage increased 927 miles, or 115 per cent, a greater proportionate amount than any other Southern state, and was behind only Kentucky and Georgia in the greatest absolute increase. This building spurt maintained Alabama's rank at having two per cent of the total mileage of the United States at the end of 1875, while the proportionate railroad mileage in most Southern states was declining. From 1867 to 1872, 777 new miles of railroad were laid, most of it prior to 1870.

Thus, by 1870, Alabama had its railroad network. It may not have been obtained through sound financing or the best methods, but it was there. Before one criticizes Stanton and others like him, it would be wise to keep the entire situation in proper perspective. The period in which Alabama's "network" was completed was part of the most corrupt era in the nation's history. If the Democrats had controlled Alabama during Reconstruction it is likely that corruption still would
have existed. With Alabama's railroad development came faster and better connections with other states and regions. New cities were founded and new industry and greater economic diversity were aided by these railroads, which were an important part of the development of the "New South."


2Ibid., 1-3

3Ibid.


6Ibid., 7-9.

7Ibid., 10-11.

8Ibid., 11-14. Giving a picture of the slowness of some roads, Renfro stated that "the road was completed to West Point on April 28, 1851, about seventeen and a half years after it was chartered," ibid., 17


10Ibid., 45.


Phillip Phillips, Substance of Remarks Delivered by P. Phillips, Esq., President of the Rail Road Convention, Held at Talladega, Ala., September, 1849 (Mobile, Alabama; 1849).


Ibid., 5.


Address of the Internal Improvement Convention, of the State of Alabama, Held in Mobile, May 28th, 1851 (Mobile; 1851), 6, 9.


Martin, Internal Improvements in Alabama. 74.


E. D. Sanford, Report of the Chief Engineer upon . . . the Northeast & Southwest Alabama Railroad . . . (Tuscaloosa, 18550, 31.


Armes, Coal and Iron in Alabama, 120.
25 John T. Milner, *Milner’s Report to the Governor of Alabama, on the Alabama Central Railroad* (Montgomery, 1859), 9-18. What is perhaps the only extant copy of this report can be found in the Southern Collection of the Birmingham Public Library.


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Cook, "Alabamians Adjust to Defeat," 127.

Ibid., 122-124; Martin, Internal Improvements in Alabama, 79.

Martin, Internal Improvements in Alabama, 87.


Ibid., 76-77.

