Political Structure and Continuing Reality

Vandiver Chaplin

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Political Structure and Continuing Reality

Vandiver Chaplin

Advisor: Dr. William Wilkerson

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Name of candidate: VanderL. Chaplin

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Project Advisor: [Signature] 4/23/08

Department Chair: [Signature] 4/23/08

Honors Program Director for Honors Council: [Signature] 4/30/08
Abstract

The function of political power in modern states is analyzed for two modes of operation: an exclusionary and an inclusionary mode. The traditional sovereign power, the monarch, represents the form of political power that is dominated by the exclusive mode, because the sovereign has the rights of life and death, and subjugates its citizenry with oppressive force. The transition out of this mode occurs during the liberal revolution, when power is divested from the king and invested in the populace. Once popular sovereignty is in place, the newly allowed system of capitalism results in the control of the labor class, by excluding them from property but necessitating social cooperation. Furthermore, new disciplinary methods are introduced which maintain control of the population in the absence of an absolute sovereign and link necessary cooperation to production. It is argued that this was all enabled due to a system of racial exploitation, and hence we should add the fact of exclusion by race into our understanding of overall political power. The conclusion based on these studies is that political power is a composition of exclusion and inclusion in the liberal state. Finally, the possible future of removing the exclusive component of liberalism is evaluated by considering contemporary liberal theory.
Political power appears at the nexus of population, land, and resources, and is the revealing sign of any political organization. Under this view, a taxonomy of political structures has been constructed on the basis of how power is constituted and invested within a populace and its specific territory. All political power operates in relationship to a political organization, which we shall also call a political structure, and much can be made of these relationships. First, we shall see that power always has a certain conception of the individuals and entities at which it is directed; it can oppose a population with objective force, or compose it, making proper subjects. And since all political power is connected to a polity and structure, it can be conceived on the basis of how it treats individuals in relationship to the core structuring agency. Does power openly coerce its citizens and deny them any rights? Or does it acknowledge basic rights, and if so, is it really subservient to those rights? It has an associated social conception of the subject, which varies with history. By connecting these two concepts, the power and the polity, we shall see that all political power is a combination of exclusionary and inclusionary modes. This is composite power.

The relationship of power to polity will be examined only for coincidental content, not for a causal structure. The mere collocation of a particular composition of power and a particular political structure in history is sufficient for us to define a basic relationship between the structure and the dominant mode of power, whether it is exclusive, inclusive, or some combination. Traditional critiques of western civilization’s middle and late forms tend to give primacy to the
historical form of organization as the necessary precursor to any exercise of power, rather than the presence of some power, and the limits thereof, within a populace as the precursor to organization. The correct order can be difficult to determine, because in actual fact each is likely to have a significant historical trend--we can explain many trends in history equally as well with either organization or power as the causative factor. Organization is, in this view, is driven by material factors like land, climate, population, and out of this, organization around a particular king or dictator occurs. The created structure and its vested interests is then what we ought to understand to understand power, under this view. However, conflictual historiography bases political structures on historical domination, on raw power of some group over others, and history is in fact a product of this struggle. To debate between the two would be going beyond the scope of this thesis, which is just to show the existence of exclusive and inclusive power are necessary to fully describe structure, but not in a uniform or necessary way, and not to argue that some particular combination(structure and polity) is in fact a metaphysical or transcendent drive or force, the formal cause of history and politics. The paradigm of compositional power--exclusion and inclusion--then is just descriptive. The only exception to this is that it must be

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1 e.g., as the strong over the weak in Hegel, Nietzsche. Also as capital over labor, white over black, and male over female

2 For example, Giorgio Agamben's work on the ban and the state of exception as the fundamental and "originary" act of Sovereign power seems to result in a metaphysical version of sovereign power that is much like composite power. The ban concept is exclusionary in a complex way: it throws out the sacred man by first drawing him into the law, and then negating his political life. He has no legal protection against being killed, yet cannot be executed. "The structure drawn by this double exception is that of a double exclusion and a double capture, which represents more than a mere analogy with the structure of the sovereign exception."(82) Thus it is the symmetry of exclusion and inclusion. The essence of Sovereignty is this ban: "What is captured in the sovereign ban is a human victim who may be killed but not sacrificed: homo sacer...The life caught in the sovereign ban is the life that is originarily sacred--that is, that may be killed [by an individual, without recourse,] but not sacrificed [by the sovereign]--and, in this sense, the production of bare life is the originary activity of sovereignty."(83) The relationship here is determined by the nature of organization--Sovereignty--and the composition is equally inclusive and exclusive from the perspective of homo sacer.

state, a form of sovereign power instituted upon a particular home territory and a particular popula-
lace, limited by the territory and population of neighbors. We shall limit this discussion to Euro-
pean states, and only to later ones (c. 1650 onwards), just because that is the structure whose rela-
tionship we want to examine. So we can ignore the causal question all together, because we are
only looking to explain political power insofar as is necessary to define its structural implements.

This will be done in association with particular organizational histories, but not explicitly
on that basis. It is not an historical examination, but rather an examination of the different theo-
ries about how power and polity have, and might still be able to, relate. ‘Stage’ and ‘develop-
ment’ below only loosely refer to historical stage; they are not denoted by time so much as by the
particular model of power.

Now then, let us examine this compositional political power. The development of the
state as the basic political structure in Europe is the context in which composite power will be
conceived. The quantity of each mode of power, exclusionary and inclusionary, is the real meas-
ure of the general mode of political power of a certain state. In the development of the state,
there are three stages in which this quantity—referred to as the composition—is significantly dif-
f erent. The first occurs in the consolidation of central power in states, such as England and
France, during the so-called Age of Absolutism. In this stage power almost completely functions
exclusively and oppressively as the power of the king over his subjects. The second stage has a
more combined power—it is represented by liberalism, the Enlightenment, e.g., Rousseau’s and
Locke’s social contract doctrines. Power is beginning to shift into the inclusive mode, yet still
maintains some oppressive operation and the ability to exclude. The final stage is the contempo-
rary one, which is virtually all inclusive, but as we shall see maintains some exclusivity.
In each of these stages, we will be considering two things: a general structure, and a particular conception of the subject citizenry. The particular form of power will be seen as the interaction of the subject with the structure. Thus, these stages are categories of historiography which are associated with historical periods, but not explicitly historical. However, there are other delineations of power modes as well, and in looking at some example historiography below we shall see developments apart from that of the state.

The Exclusive Mode

Exclusionary power is the same as oppressive power. It is the power of domination and exploitation. This stage of power has been characterized in numerous ways. It is what Foucault discusses as the period where sovereignty is practiced explicitly:

“In certain societies, of which the feudal regime is only an example, it may be said that individualization is greatest where sovereignty is exercised and in the higher echelons of power. The more one possesses power or privilege, the more one is marked as an individual, by rituals, written accounts or visual representations. The ‘name,’...the performance of deeds that demonstrate superior strength and are immortalized in writing,...the monuments or donations that bring survival after death,...the multiple, intersecting links of allegiance and suzerainty, all these are procedures of an ‘ascending’ individualization.”

Under the practice of sovereignty, individual subjects are treated with objectifying force. There is little to becoming an individual, all it takes is the brute exercise of power in one of these manners. One’s life is all but conceded to anyone who is overcome by the raw power of another. With enough attention, this overcoming can be ritualized and elevated to a political status.

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A ruler who perhaps epitomized this type of sovereignty was Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715). He undertook expansionist and religious warfare, gained control of the French nobility, and became the ostentatious center of French cultural life. His extravagant spending extended royal patronage such that he became involved in the very production of culture and the spread of ideas. The sovereign exercise of exclusive power is apparent in Louis’ reaffirmation of France’s alliance with Catholicism, when he revoked religious toleration in the Edict of Nantes in 1685.

“2. Our subjects of the Supposedly Reformed Religion are not to assemble for worship in any place or house for any reason.

... 4. Ministers of the Supposedly Reformed Religion who have not converted are to leave the kingdom within fifteen days and are not to preach or perform any functions in the meantime, or they will be sent to the galleys.

... 10. All subjects belonging to the Supposedly Reformed Religion and their wives and children are forbidden to leave the country or to send out their property and effects. The penalty for men is the galleys and women confiscation of their persons and property.”

Such decrees are in a sense enabled by the ritual power of the sovereign, and are rituals in themselves. We can see in this edict not only the sovereign enforcing the necessary constraints on the populace to meet its foreign policy agenda, but also the rights over the individual in the ability to take life, and the literal exclusion of one form of religious culture from the state. This is one place exclusionary power is represented, in the edict.

It is the distribution of such rituals in society, following Foucault’s definition, that form the substance and create the structure of sovereignty. Under this structure, the subjugated are

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mere objects to which force can be applied. We can see, in this conception, another example: the
idea of ritualized racism. During the same historical period, mercantile imperialist economies
were the beginning in Europe. The Spanish in the Caribbean and South America, the French in
North America and West Africa, the English beginning their colonial empire. These enterprises
were state institutions, funded by revenues collected by the sovereign, using the military mecha-
nism of which the sovereign was the head. The conquests of indigenous peoples became a nec-
essary element to any European state, and indeed the riches won and the glory which emanated
became a ritual measure by which sovereign powers gauged themselves. The power exercised
over far away places, and over the instruments of the pursuit--the soldiers, natural resources, and
the booty--is explicitly oppressive. So, while colonialism may have been perpetrated for the
purpose of access to new resources, it was more for the fact of stealing actual wealth (and just
not resources, potential wealth), representing the sovereign’s greatness, and the gluttony of in-
creased ritualizing.

Thus, the power of the sovereign is really conceived in relationship to the structure of
sovereign action: it acts upon an objective substance--the body, the land, the populace--which it
conceives of as without power, and hence as without right. The subject of sovereignty is treated
such that one’s sovereignty-potential (one’s power) is the norm, and since there is but one
ritualization--namely, the state organ--there’s just one center in which sovereignty can exist in a
particular society. All subjects are in a sense then evaluated for the sovereign potential (their
power like the sovereign’s), but of course do not have any portion, and hence are subject to
treatment similar to that of an enemy. Indeed, perhaps one explanation for why war on a popu-
lace did not really occur in the period of absolute rule is that it is the sovereign’s right to domi-
nate his own subjects, but not to dominate the subjects of another sovereign power. The social conception then is one which is based purely on power and the aggregation of it over time through the immortalization of ritual. The king and the nobility are these aggregations in society; since the subjects have no ritual honor they have no power in this social structure.

**Transition: Exclusive Inclusion**

The transition in the quality of composite power from exclusion to the beginnings of inclusionary mechanisms can be understood in several ways. First, as the entrance of rights and equity into society in order to divest power from the center into a wider ruling class; privilege, not just ritual power, becomes part of the scheme in evaluating society. Second, as the increase of population density and the beginnings of mechanisms of population control which are simultaneously controlling yet somehow voluntary; liberal choice, rational and reasonable behavior, and the idea of total individual responsibility become the basis for justification of social circumstances, away from the previous 'might makes right' mode of sovereignty. Third, as the displacement of a part of the sovereign’s objective force to external localities, enabling the liberal social change.

The first understanding concerns the divestment of sovereignty from a central monarchy into a *bourgeois* political economy. Historically speaking, this occurred in the age of social contract philosophy and the revolutionary impulse to institute democratic governments to represent the new free will of its populace and constitutions to codify basic rights. This enabled a system of private property and markets to become the main means of economy and production. Under this system, power became distributed along lines of wealth, which could be achieved more, ide-
ally speaking, by an individual’s actions in the competitive market than by an inherited right. In short then, power is conceived in terms of *earnings* and individual action, a revolution against the ritualized system of sovereign power. Of course, the concept of ritual can still be applied, but it begins to shift power from an honorific right to *purchase* power, the acquisition of money.

*Capital and Labor*

What begins in the transitional mode is the idea of a political economy that neutralizes members of society into an economic scheme of productivity, savvy, profitability. In this scheme, political power is first conceived in terms of a political economy; the privileged in this system maintain control by a favored distribution of goods and property, replacing the explicit domination of the sovereign structure, by *including* the means of oppression into the basic necessities of life. The basis of society becomes its mode of production, in which the populace must participate.

Karl Marx’s explanation of how the basic and fundamental operations of society are *productive* necessitates that the processes of industrialization in a nation-state ultimately create class division within its population, and hence power, privilege, and a social structure of domination, between those that are landed (private property) and control the means to social production, and those that do not. I shall first proceed to show the Marxian view of production and how it specifies productivity as human labor, and the meeting of human needs.

To Marx, production is the defining characteristic of human societies, and is the foundational activity of society. This characterization is particularly intended for nations undergoing industrialization, for a number of reasons which I will briefly mention. Industrialization creates
an increased division of labor in society as labor-power is applied to distributed tasks. The fundamental purpose of production is to meet the needs of society. Without going into specifics, the basic idea is that the members of society participate in production to meet the needs of society, instead of solely meeting their own needs. Since every person has a range of needs, and needs a range of things, or “commodities”, to meet them, there must be a distribution of specialized labor-tasks in society in which the individual laborer produces a surplus of some particular socially necessary good. Instead of meeting his own set of needs, he works to meet one need that is generally in everyone’s set (i.e., the set of society’s needs). But since his labor-power is only applied in this specialized manner, and none is designated for the production of any other good (i.e., he is within a division of labor), all of the remaining labor-power he has after producing the socially necessary amount, all that he would use to meet his other needs, can be used to more effectively produce the exact same good, to meet the same need. Once his function becomes specialized, the one who controls his means of production and is the outlet for his labor-power can reward him in smaller measure than he produced, because the social needs have been met.

We can naively construe this as the a co-opting of the working-day. Leisure time under a framework of the individual meeting his needs would be available in this working day, because he would simply be able to perform all the necessary tasks to allow him such “time”. Even after the set of these necessary tasks gets distributed to others, that is, once there is a set of common necessary tasks and divisional sectors to do them, it is not necessary that the working day would lengthen. That is, whether the meeting of needs is individual or social, the same point of necessity would hold, and it would not require a “full” working day from any person to meet everyone’s needs.
In the more appropriate labor-power construction, the total labor-power expended in society would be nearly the same whether individuals met their own needs or produced socially necessary goods. This amount, the integral amount of labor, is relatively independent of the mode of production, as long as individuals do only what is necessary to meet the needs of their own or society. All labor, according to Marx, is necessary only to a certain point. But, it is the expropriation and division of labor, the creation of surplus value, and the codification of labor-power as labor-time by a monetary system that masks this point of necessity. Since it distributes labor over time, and pays wages, it inflates the apparent cost of labor-power such that the wage is distributed over more time than is socially necessary. In this way the capitalist, he who controls the means to production, captures more labor-power than he pays for, and creates surplus value.

In an ideal communist state, this is the elimination of exploitative labor, private property, and the coercion of the political life of the individual by an ideology of surplus values and wealth accumulation. This must be done on the basis of Marx's scientific assessment of the capitalist mode of production. As conceived in *Capital*, coercion occurs upon both the capitalist and the laborer: the first by his own greed and the necessity to increase profit against its natural decline, the second by having been forced into alienating production by the necessity of selling his labor-power, which of course goes for less than its socially necessary value. For this reason it is an inefficient political economy: it expends total productive power to beyond what is necessary to meet the average social need. It must continue creating surpluses in value, which can only be carried out by the exploitation of the propertyless, and hence the labor class increases in popula-
tion, yet decreases in real profit. This would theoretically lead to more and more oppression of the laboring population, an overt polarization of society and an unstable situation.

However, before the scientific scrutiny of Capital and the more precise formulation of this inefficiency, an ethical conception seems to have been guiding his entire view of what an efficient and just political economy might be. In the first section of "Manuscripts", written in the spring of 1844, he explains that the worker in a system of capital and private property is alienated from the product of his labor:

"This fact simply indicates that the object which labor produces, its product, stands opposed to it as an alien thing, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labor is embodied and made objective in a thing... The worker is at home when he is not working and when he is working he is not at home. His work, therefore, is not voluntary but coerced, forced labor."

Alienated labor is particularly despicable to him because "nature furnishes the means of life... the means of physical subsistence of the worker himself," In divorcing the laborer from production and his own appropriation of these natural means, man is alienated from nature, from "himself, his own active function," and from his species: "...[the worker] is acting freely only in his animal functions... while in his human function he feels only like an animal." He becomes homo animalis from homo sapiens--a homo faber. Because capitalism exploits man's natural life activity it reflects a kind of moral inefficiency, a chronic and perpetual exclusion from natural life.

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6 Ibid., 60

7 Ibid., 62
Under these conditions life is struggle, and this seems to mean that individual and social life is generally inhibited in its pursuit of the basic social good or any individual good.8

Some interesting biographical commentary has also been done that highlights relevant early personal concerns. For example, J.E. Seigel sees a strong connection between personal struggle and social struggle. An essay written at age 17, "Reflections of a Youth on the Choice of Vocation," reveals Marx's certainty that we have little choice of our circumstances in social life, and how many of them are already determined at a young age. He is worried about choosing wrongly, and having one's mind struggle against the body's necessary duties in an unhappy profession. He believed this would lead to an overall weakening of the individual.9 But even in such a case, there is a greater struggle in overcoming that weakness in the service of a greater good. "Marx felt an impulse to 'mock the rights' of his physical nature and lift himself above it, to act 'with weakness and yet-with strength.' ..." Seigel connects this with the teleology in Marx's view of historical development. "'[This is] Why,' Marx would declare on the eve of 1848, 'social reforms are never carried by the weakness of the strong, but always by the strength of the weak.'"10

The conclusion of this discussion of Marx's labor theory is that it shows precisely how the capitalist model instituted during the liberal revolution is its own form of power, and institutes a power structure in society. Because the labor class will never be able to 'privilege its way out' of the exploitative system, it must either depend on its own revolt or accept the status quo.

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8 The idea that individuals should pursue their own interests and happiness is not unique to liberal philosophy. Indeed one of Marx's motivations was to free the laboring masses from oppressive wage-labor precisely so individual pursuits would not be excluded merely for lack of money.


10 Ibid., 479
Thus, in labor under capitalism there is at once inclusion into the market system by means of money, wages, and the commodity, and exclusion by means of private property and the means of production. The subject is included by the egalitarian conception of privilege (equal because it is not a priori exclusive), but excluded by the fact of private control over property, money, and the actual conditions privilege. Thus the relationship between the subject and the social structure is one of a dual, composite power.

Once we understand the labor situation, the second transitional feature is apparent. This is another effect power in liberal political economy. The neutral monetary and economic pre-placement of the individual, in order to function, begins to create a certain kind of social good. Since market-based social cooperation is necessary in this system, the cooperative impulse within individuals must be instated. Those in whom it cannot be established must be contained or controlled, and those in whom it is correctly established and autonomously active become society’s successful and decent. The good in question is that which legitimizes the social-cooperative life, a kind of political life in that it exists solely as a result of the political economy and structure; it is the norm.

*Discipline and Normality*

Foucault’s analysis in *Discipline and Punish* is a brilliant effort to expose the operation of the social good within the formation of social structures. He goes about this in a novel way; he does not attempt to identify in particular social goods by means of companionate discourses and transfer those discoveries to structure as it is found. Rather, he takes the existing structures
which form individuals exposes the techniques, arriving at a set fundamental aims: to make docile and productive individuals, to distribute individuals according to their productive capacities (docility-utility), to automate the norm under a morality and judgment which compels social values and cooperation (panopticism), and to conceal these needs in a liberal ideology under a legal structure.

The first aim, to make docile bodies, is necessary to ensure the proceeding goals of productivity and normality. This is why he conceives of it as *training*. The docility of the body is seen in a number of examples, and while there is some common structure to ‘docility programs’, it is really a paradigm of case study is applicable in different ways. The common elements are that institutions which have the need, or the task, of integrating bodies into complex machinations must undertake a regime of highly focused training. For example, the infantryman must be fully integrated with his rifle, and this represents a broken down time: “the Prussian regulations of 1743 laid down six stages to bring the weapon to one’s foot, four to extend it, thirteen to raise it to the shoulder, etc.” He must be immediate in the complex of battlefield maneuvers, able to execute an order immediately. Thus his activity his made more useful.

Space, as well as time, is used to contribute to productive organization. For example, a system of *ranking* divorces organizational status from static spatial confines into a meaningful distribution across space:

“In discipline, the elements are interchangeable, since each is defined by the place it occupies in a series, and by the gap the separates it from the others. The [(military)] unit is, therefore, neither the territory (unit of domination), nor the place (unit of residence), but the rank: the place one occupies in a classification, the point at which a line and column

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11 n.3 154
intersect, the interval in a series of intervals. Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for
the transformation of arrangements."^{12}

The unit is arranged such that it takes absolute space and structures. The effect this has on the
individual within the space is to create an internal product of the structure, without a pole or
externality: “It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but
distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations.”

The effect of such techniques of controlling activity and the ranking of space is to induce
a ranking of the self within the individual. In this way training, and being situated within a struc-
ture, provides the means to automation and cooperation. It produces a normal type of psychol-
ogy (with the aid of scientific psychology, of course) and perception of the space, rank and struc-
ture, and determines individual success.

Rank, then, is a form of status achieved by proper behavior within the military unit, and
is altogether the pursuit proper to ‘good’ soldiers, which is to say, normal soldiers. Generalize
this example unit to represent social organizations: what ranking in fact means is that the distri-
bution of labor and compensation is for those who obey a certain normal pursuit in their range of
life.

Thus it is clear how the normal in fact becomes the good: by means of measured, struc-
tured advancement and reward, in which the rewarding system is not challenged. Such stability
is in fact the universal aim of the disciplinary society. It no longer epitomizes a gluttony of
wealth (not to say that powerful individuals do not), but rather a stabilization of production and
normal conditions.

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^{12} Ibid., 146
Now, the norm is maintained by means of the invested power of disciplinary training. As regular needs of society are instituted—e.g., national defense, public health—it becomes necessary to enforce the norm, and to protect it. Thus the model of *panopticism*, panoptic power, pervades society.¹³ It is an anonymous and pervasive watcher who can see all actions, and has the ability to call out transgressions against the norm and discipline bad behavior. "Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used."¹⁴ Foucault, in fact, thinks the basic logic of the panopticon operates in society’s policing agencies, which are both political and moral, to maintain normality. The prison, for example, is the result of this social defense. The real power though is not in its omniscience, but in the fact that it is internalized in every disciplined individual. The process of discipline requires such ‘self-regulation’. Thus the watcher becomes part of the subject, and it accounts for the scruples of the socially good.

This shows that the idea of social cooperation is in fact meant to play a certain role. The norm represents a specific manner of cooperative activity, intentionally structured around integration and discipline. Behavior, scruples, and social morality are formed around the norm. Deviance from the norm then represents a "social problem." The modern problem, that is, the problem most associated with modernity and the modern state, is that the entire process by which a "social problem" enters perception is designed to blur and distort that perception itself, to ultimately manufacture a type of perception which will lead to least resistance against the productive needs of society. A good illustration of this is the treatment of the mentally ill as socially threatening. In these cases, which are all too common, a mentally ill person crosses a normal bound-

¹³ The model is Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. See Foucault, *DP*: p.200.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 205
ary of private property or personal space. Even if a crime was not explicitly committed, there is still the expectation that he is unpredictable, and in the next instance of this he might harm someone or himself. Thus he is perceived above all else to be a social threat (that is, "craziness" becomes the only seeable characteristic); since the only recourse for us in handling a social threat is judicial protection, he is either locked up or puts himself at risk to it. There is almost no hope of treatment of course, because treatment mechanisms are not socially cost-effective. The paradigm of meta-identity and perception by which he was at first identified as "mentally ill" never comes into question; if it does it passes out quite quickly by the desperate relief of life and society defended, and the effete satisfaction that nothing else could be done.

The paradigm of normal and abnormal, of the good citizen and the threat-to-good is what operates. Here, as in many places, normative knowledge becomes difference, difference becomes fear, fear becomes force. The created perception is thus both reduced from what was prior, and increased in its systematic component; it takes situations of moral dissent, dissenting intuitions or judgements, about social states and reduces the dissent by providing both a judgement and course of action that are socially endorsed and socially optimal.

For these reasons if we were to extensively examine the great many things threatening our society, what we would have in fact is an excellent method for social self-examination. This is in fact what Foucault. The normal obey the norm, the abnormal are censured, excluded, detained, etc. Since the most fundamental cooperative activity is the production of society's needs, discipline is necessarily a function of the means of its production, and hence, there is a high degree of productivity within any normality. Labor is normalized by the wage, the monetary form of power which is market power and universally in society. Thus the structure of power rules
by inclusion into the disciplinary and productive system; it is necessarily exclusive of all social threats it cannot control. Therefore we can see the composition of power arising out of the integration of subject within the means of production. Modern composite power then is the union of disciplinary power and the political economy of capitalism.

Now, the final point about the transition from explicit sovereign exclusion to the more composite power model is that it was enabled by a seemingly contradictory action: namely, legitimate racial exploitation. When it in fact seemed that sovereign central powers were forced to relinquish their power and divest it to the populace, what evolved was a system of exploitation along racial lines in the colonies and under the slave trade. Effectively, the power of the sovereign was displaced from the white nation to a particular non-white group.

**Contract and Displacement**

The first sentence of the Charles Mills' *The Racial Contract* is: "White supremacy is the unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today."15 His thesis is a re-reading of the social contracts of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. The general point is that the social contract, in every one of its forms, intentionally limited the extension of liberal ideas to white people, despite the universalized tone, and in this way endorsed racism and exploitation within the colonies. My point is that such legitimized racism enabled the liberal revolution for two reasons: it let sovereigns to objectify a new set of people, and hence-reduced their resistance

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to the divestment of power, and it provided the economic means to allow the new *laissez-faire* system to flourish.

The immediate result of the liberal revolution, in regards to racism, was to create a social ontology of "person" and "subperson." The exploitative slave trade and colonial empire of the mercantile era had to be legitimized in some way by the enlightenment thinkers. There were the awkward inventions of biological and religious racism, which held an intrinsic superiority in whiteness and were explicitly racist. In social contract theory, the egalitarianism newly conceived had racial criteria--'equality among equals'. This means that:

"For blacks, the degradation of racial slavery...first acquired a color. Nonwhite subpersonhood is enshrined simultaneously with white personhood...For the colonial project, personhood would be raced."\textsuperscript{16}

This distinction immediately excludes subpersons and licenses oppressive power. Now, 'black' and 'white' are colored notions, but as Mills maintains, they really represent socially constructed race categories. There is some nuance to the conflictual categories, but the main distinction is that there is a definite "personness" along racial lines.

Mills says the racial contract is the truth of the social contract:

"The evolution of the modern version of the contract, characterized by an antipatriarachalist Enlightenment liberalism, with its proclamations of the equal rights, autonomy, and freedom for all men, thus took place simultaneously with the massacre, expropriation, and hereditary slavery of men at least apparently human."\textsuperscript{17}

The racial contract then is the actual form of the social contract, because it limits the terms of the agreement to whites. He goes on to show how the social contracts of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau,}

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 56-57

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 64
and Kant all operate on a denial of various aspects of the political life of non-whites, and their
subperson stature. The point is the same throughout.

This, I believe, enabled the revolution in Europe to succeed for the reasons mentioned above. The contractarians endorsed the same objectifying power in the colonies as had the sov-
ereign in the state. And furthermore, the economic benefit of the exploitative labor and colonial
trade reduced the constraints of power and struggle on the continent. By seizing territory, the
state gave trouble-making Huguenots, Puritans, Anabaptists, and criminals a legitimated outlet:
populate the colonies. The trade and manufactory system in the colonies operated under slave
labor or extremely cheap labor, providing material, some cheap goods, but also whole new mar-
kets for the goods manufactured in Europe. Hence, the endorsement of racial exploitation in the
colonies under the systems of slavery and manufactory afforded Europe the land it needed to ex-
pand(saving it perhaps from further conflict) and the economic boom to entrench capitalism.

Thus, the liberal state was able to rise by including non-whites into the territory and labor
system of imperial rule while excluding them from citizenship. In this way the sovereign
European states displaced their basic objectifying power; it did not disappear.

To conclude what the transition to a composite political power means then: we have
moved from an era where political structures were explicitly exclusionary to one which, on the
face of it, seeks to include all into an egalitarian power structure and political economy. Yet this
has turned out to be a merely partial inclusion, since the egalitarianism has in fact been special-
ized in the number of ways described. Under the capitalist system, egalitarianism is conceived
of as equality of opportunity, and equality of the criterion for power--namely, purchase power.
However, it automatically excludes an entire class of people--the ones who are propertyless and institutionally disadvantaged to become so. Racial exploitation, which was originally legitimated in law, functioned under a special equality as well. It allowed only whites, who are in fact not ethnically, biologically, or literally white but politically white, rape and enslave the uncivilized nether-peoples of the globe. Since this functioned to entrench liberal governments in the proximity of liberal ideals, the equality of the social contract was not in fact equality. Under the disciplinary system, the divested power of the ruler seems to have found its place. Yet, this system has instituted its own exclusion in the form of normality. While it has succeeded in breaking out of the forced and coercive structure of power over the populace, it is in its own way coercive, and should be recognized as a substantive form of inclusionary power.

Comprehensive Inclusion and Contemporary Liberalism

The final commentary I would like to offer is about the dream of ideal liberalism and creating an comprehensively inclusive democracy. If we examine social contract theories, what we find is that the traditional core value is that of a universal position in which all subjects under consideration, all who are signatories of the social contract, are said to be equal. The necessity of this universality in creating general freedom, or perhaps generic freedom, as well justifying state power, gives social contract theory the ability to give a new form of sovereignty, a kind of practical absolutism--power, glory, and truth derived from mass cooperation, a general belief that this system is the highest and the best. This derives from the universalized nature of "the man" who signs over his natural freedom to society in order that it might be protected. The core

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18 This is where the idea of welfare capitalism comes in.
of traditional social contract theory is that it assumes to represent the essential human quality of its subject citizens, and thus is licensed, both by society and natural right, to have sovereign powers.

In order to justify its sovereignty then, it must secure this universal contract. For the reasons given above, the traditional universality has been exposed for what it is: exclusive and not universality at all. Motivated by an attempt to solve this problem, the contemporary social contractarian, John Rawls, advocated a system in which the greatest plurality of persons are guaranteed a place in the contract, called “justice as fairness”. He updates the essential quality of man in the universal position, which he calls the original position, to require the ability to exist within a “reasonable pluralism” and participate in reasonable and rational social discourse. Behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance we want to determine what society our rational and reasonable self would choose to live in, without knowing where our place in it might be. He concludes that we would choose a constitutional democracy with a strong welfare system, in which public goods are distributed to give the maximal least-benefit to the poorest, mainly on the basis that in our rational choice, we would prefer to be poorest in such a system.\textsuperscript{19}

This system has some degree of promise, however, its fundamental problem is that it places the requirements of his ideal ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ upon signatories. In practice, this means that people should more or less accept the status quo, with perhaps some minor welfare adjustment, because it is derived from the ideal reasonable, rational agent in the original position. Not accepting it would, at some level, be a subjection to accusations of irrationality and unreasonableness, and rejections as an illegitimate perspective and criticism. Thus Rawls’ theory

\textsuperscript{19} The actual details of the rational choice are more complicated.
functions to justify all inequality by removing the historical facts of unfair distribution from the contractual society. Reparations, for instance, or affirmative action, would only be justified as forms of welfare. This is problematic, because it does not address the core social problem of institutional causation of such inequality. It gives it the opportunity to gain somewhat, but only under the conditions of social normality, as described earlier.

The individual who is to be included in society is cooperative, successful, and above all normalized along an axis culled from the distributive scheme which best suits some particular social function. He becomes the model individual. Under the model, the individual is one whose being becomes increasingly linked to society, whose identity is malleable, whose morals dictate integration and question the validity of social reform, who is reasonable and rational for the sake of social discourse, and who participates in a productive scheme to increase social goods. In short, these qualities are necessary for the determinate body of society to function. They are systematically derived necessities, and are meant to prefigure a functional individuality, individuality in the optimal position.

In conclusion then, we can see the matter on which inclusion operates. It removes all content from the subject and refills him with the universal social good. In so doing, it defines individuality, and hence predefines which individuals are meant to be in society, and which are meant to be excepted from it. It determines what it means to be a person, which is the ability to exist as ones' rationally and "universally" derived, or rather projected, signatory. Liberalism thus appears to be proceeding towards inclusion by circumventing it: by increasingly forming individuals into socially confluent, cooperative model citizens, created on the basis of universal-ity, it is ever removing its need for exclusionary force.
Bibliography


