Individual, Group, and Paradox: Essentials of the Social Bond

Alex Tonus

Follow this and additional works at: https://louis.uah.edu/honors-capstones

Recommended Citation
https://louis.uah.edu/honors-capstones/628

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College at LOUIS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Capstone Projects and Theses by an authorized administrator of LOUIS.
INDIVIDUAL, GROUP, AND PARADOX:
ESSENTIALS OF THE SOCIAL BOND

Alex Tonus

University of Alabama in Huntsville
College of Liberal Arts

Dr. James Winchell, Advisor
Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures

Dr. Conrad N. Jackson
Department of Management and Marketing

Honors Project

Spring 1995
ABSTRACT

INDIVIDUAL, GROUP, AND PARADOX;
ESSENTIALS OF THE SOCIAL BOND

Alex Tonus

The relation between the individual and the group has long been the subject of many in-depth studies. Virtually all the scholastic disciplines recognize and acknowledge the importance of both the organizational entity and its constituent elements. Furthermore, many scholars have researched and reflected on the nature of the interactions between the two concepts. This study seeks to synchronically relate the methods and results of some of those scholars, in an attempt to identify certain commonalities and possible divergences.

This study is based on a thorough, interpretative analysis of three works of major importance: Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *The Social Contract*, Sigmund Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, and Frederick W. Taylor's *Scientific Management*. I chose these works because they are the products of three disciplines which are not intrinsically related. Although philosophy, psychoanalysis, and management science all deal with the human condition and its improvement, they do approach the relationships between individual and group in their own specific ways.

The analysis of these three distinct approaches, in the works mentioned above, reveals that each one is based on the assumption of a paradoxical relationship between the individual and the group. Whereas neither of the two concepts is meaningful or viable on its own, their interaction, seen from various perspectives, seems to produce a paradox. Whether this paradox is productive or counterproductive remains to be determined in the human laboratory.
CONTENTS

Introduction: A Synchronous Approach
Part I: Rousseau and the Salvaging of the Individual
Part II: Freud and the Punishment of the Ego
Part III: Taylor and the Systematic Man
Conclusion: A Practical Approach
INTRODUCTION

This study attempts to define some of the characteristics of the social bond which permeates society since its inception. The relationships which exist between human beings shape their societies as well as the social structures for which they develop affinities. The intricate nature of the relationships between individuals and groups has been scrutinized from many different points of view. This analysis will focus on the philosophical considerations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the psychological findings of Sigmund Freud, and the managerial viewpoints of Frederick Winslow Taylor. It will attempt to demonstrate the paradoxical nature of the interaction of those two complementary concepts: individual, or the monad of identity for any given consciousness, and group, or the aggregate cement that maintains a given social bond.

This study will attempt to describe certain dynamics of change that are inherent to these concepts, themselves. Each takes on different characteristics when viewed under the pre-established assumptions of different disciplines. It must also be noted that the individual interpretations of the theorists subsequently influence the appearance and treatment of the subject, as well as the understanding of those interpretations in this essay. The assumptions of the disciplines and the personal interests guiding the theorists thus project biased viewpoints as much as they reflect absolute and verifiable truths. This analysis, therefore,
cannot be equated to a mathematical model, but should be viewed rather as the result of a perspectivist approach, which follows the rule that no single overarching reality dominates this issue, and that the existence of any concept depends therefore on the ideational constellation within which it is viewed. It is not possible, nor will I attempt, in such a synchronic analysis, to trace an historical dynamic of change that proves this paradoxical rule: the only rule of change is that there is no rule. Instead, I will try to articulate my understanding of three particular theories which implicate the complexity inherent in both the individual and the group, and possibly arrive at a synthesis which takes into account certain blind spots of these interpretations.

These three interpretations result from the works of the representatives of three distinct disciplines. It will become apparent that each theorist refers to the social bond, i.e., the interconnectivity between individual and group, in a technically specific way. The given components of the social bond between individual and group, therefore, also reflect particular connotations given them by the theorists. These contrasting and personal conceptualizations vary remarkably from the philosopher to the psychoanalyst and the managerial theorist.

Such differences emerge when we consider the respective definitions of the group as formulated in the three approaches at hand. For one author, the citizens of Geneva, untouched by the workings of the Enlightenment, may represent the perfect group of
virtuous individuals: therefore, every conscious effort of social change should be directed toward establishing such a society. For another, it may be the unorganized mob roaming the streets of Germany which must be assigned the attributes required of a social group to survive in a civilized society. For yet another, the perfect group may be a highly organized structure, guided by numerical principles, and reducing to a nominal level the importance of the individual. While each writer may interpret a concept in his own way and within the constraints of his particular discipline, the fact remains: the concept itself has an innate and overarching value. The complexity of such a system of multiple, interconnected, and necessarily biased interpretations thus requires a perspectivist approach.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau dedicated the major part of his life's work to the study of the characteristics and qualities of these two problematic concepts: the individual and the group. His philosophical approach throughout his writing indicates a strong and even fundamental desire to determine the conditions under which individuality can exist and flourish. Sigmund Freud's approach to the same issue, a century and a half later, pursues a scientifically based analysis of these same concepts and the differences between them; contrary to Rousseau, Freud examines the individual subject and draws his conclusions from clinical observation, abstaining from the philosopher's wish to design a
"perfect society." A third approach holds that, in a world characterized by the division of labor, the working environment determines how and where these concepts take on values which underlie all social interaction; in the realm of business and productivity, efficiency is of the utmost importance. Frederick Taylor's "scientific management" attempts to eliminate a major part of the social interaction considered crucial by Rousseau and Freud, to replace it with rules and regulations that reduce the individual to an efficient component of a structured and organized group.

The questions such a juxtaposition raises are many and point to issues crucial for the promotion of a broader approach to overarching realities. The narrow view that many experts seem to favor is a result of their education and specialization. This study, therefore, attempts to present certain advantages resulting from a comparative, multi-disciplinary approach. Scrutinizing and taking into account the research and conclusions of others may help us to formulate more complete and, therefore, more efficient answers to our problems. Such an approach, however, requires a willingness to question our paradigms and to overcome our prejudices.
I

Individual and Group in Rousseau's

The Social Contract

*If individuality has no play, society does not advance; if individuality breaks out of all bounds, society perishes.*

Thomas Henry Huxley

**Administrative Nihilism**

Paradoxically enough, Rousseau's views could easily be mistaken for those of both a leftist, Marxist-Communist ideology or for a rightist, totalitarian solution to the inherently dysfunctional relationship between individual and group. Rousseau expresses his conclusions, as well as the solution for the problem he identifies between individual and group, in *The Social Contract*:

Each of us puts in common his person and his whole power under the supreme direction of the general will; and in return we receive every member as an indivisible part of the whole. (18-19)

We might easily be misled by this language which seems to say that the individual must submit himself completely to the will of a decision-making elite, in order to reap the benefits of an organized or developed society. The wording seems to advocate and promote the benefits of the group and to imply the impossibility of
autonomous individual achievement. In other words, this statement may be read as expressing the death of categorical individuality as it confirms the group as the essential and fundamental social component.

However, this socio-contractual clause also acknowledges the antecedent existence of the individual as an entity separate from the group. As a remedial solution to this problem, Rousseau quickly recognizes that a change in the status of both entities must occur: the individual, on the one hand, must acknowledge his dependence upon the group, while on the other, the identity of the group must change to recognize the singularity, and to permit the survival, of the categorical individual. It becomes necessary therefore to identify or locate the source of this problem in order to prescribe the philosopher's remedy. Any critical analysis of the origin of Rousseau's problem is not possible, consequently, without an understanding of how the philosopher procedurally defines the concepts of "individual" and "group" themselves.

Rousseau begins his discussion of The Social Contract with the following statement: "Man was born free and everywhere he is in chains" (7). This statement forms the unalterable basis for his subsequent search for an amelioration of the human condition. He acknowledges that the group, larger than the individual, has supplanted the latter in society. "Not genius," comments Judith Shklar, "but the primitive man repressed in each of us cries out for help" (55). This primitive man, this original individual,
imprisoned by the restrictive demands imposed on him by his own
evolution, must be given the essential skills to survive in the
hostile environment he created. Contrary perhaps to the modern
reader's expectations, Rousseau then concentrates on defining group
characteristics which would permit the survival of the individual
not only despite this larger, pre-existing social organization, but
also because of that organization. The individual thus becomes the
condition *sine qua non* for the existence of the group and,
therefore, for the survival of society. At the same time, this
approach also determines the futility, or even the impossibility,
of the individual without the existence of the group. Given the
fact that society, in Rousseau's eyes, is an indisputable vehicle
of human evolution, the individual's value becomes meaningful only
through his contributions to the group. Paradoxically, Rousseau may
have recognized this productively value-based relationship as both
a liberating force and as one of the "chains" which ultimately
restrict individual freedom.

If we simply removed these chains, man, like an animal born
and reared in captivity, would not survive in an environment
without familiar restrictions. Rousseau realized that the return of
the individual to what he terms "the natural state" was impossible.
In Rousseau's view only "the natural state" guaranteed true
individuality. Once man changed into what might be called a "social
individual," his faculties of independent decision-making were
lost, and thus his individual status was curtailed by the chains of
society. These restrictive forces must be eliminated in a society which is oriented toward the re-establishment of individuality, even as Rousseau acknowledges the immutable existence of a social construct. This void, once conceptually created, is then to be filled by what Rousseau calls the "general will."

This concept is designed by the philosopher to replace the chains, i.e. the social and moral constraints, imposed on the individual by a decadent society. Shklar defines the general will as "...that faculty, possessed by all men, that defends them against destructive impulses and influences," and she further completes her definition by describing the concept as "...a transposition of the most essential individual faculty to the realm of public experience" (184). The general will may thus be understood as the basic mechanism accessible to the individual to ensure his survival in society. Furthermore, the general will may be viewed as an essential component of the concept of individuality: without general will, individuality would not exist. Another author contends that Rousseau was the first to define man's sense of loss of control over a social environment that has grown too complex. (Plamenatz, 403) The general will could thus become the essential instrument to remodel that social environment. Plamenatz further defines equality among members of society as an absolute prerequisite for the development of the general will. (395) Thus, for the general will to be the true product of all of the group members' individual contributions, those contributions
must be given equal weight. Furthermore, they must be made compulsory, which is one of the restrictions that group life imposes on its constituents. Equality becomes in that manner a determinant for individuality, which illustrates the paradoxical nature of the interaction of individual and group. According to these interpretations, the general will may thus be understood not only as an effect, but also as a cause, and as the essential condition that allows the existence of both individual and group.

Consequently, the abstract nature of this concept is difficult to define, since it refers not only to a decision-making process based on democratic voting rules, but also to a socio-political value system representing a crucial aspect of the change process, one which must be undergone by the members of the group. A priori, despite this seemingly inherent difficulty, this concept of the "general will" becomes the governing organism in Rousseau's model of a perfect society. In other words, the "general will" stands as a sovereign concept, replacing the king or any traditionally autonomous sovereign individual within such a society. This shift underlies what I call Rousseau's Paradox: the individual must cease to exist in order to exist.

This paradox seems productive rather than restrictive for the philosopher's project, however: the "general will" makes a third term of the process of change - one as yet undetermined - possible. This dynamic third term, this new individual, whose status must be eradicated in order to become part of a valid society, re-emerges
subsequently as the "social individual."

This abstract synthesis, for Rousseau, emerges as a brilliantly flexible one because it both describes and prescribes social realities and social changes. Nonetheless, the terms "general will" or "sovereign" both indicate a hierarchical relationship within a society organized according to Rousseau's model. The "social individual" or citizen of Rousseau's society must not only accept the sovereign as the ultimate authority, but also discard his own private opinions and actions in favor of the impositions made on him by the "general will." Such totalitarian authority may appear to be destructive, especially if viewed within the context of traditional democratic societal regimes. However, as a purely theoretical creation, Rousseau's societal model should not be viewed in such a context. The negative impression we may perceive becomes irrelevant when we look more closely at the uncanny attributes of Rousseau's sovereign and its conceptual other.

To take this closer look, it is necessary to distinguish between the will of the private individual and that of the citizen in order to determine the qualities of the modern sovereign. Rousseau states that "...there is a great difference between being bound to oneself and to the whole of which one forms part" (20). The citizen's individual will is based on and directed toward the good of the group and, therefore, on a socio-political and moral value system which differs strongly from one based solely on the
rights of the private individual. Thus, the general will articulates the ingenious combination of each individual will as expressed by each citizen of Rousseau's society; the traditional sovereign is being displaced by a people who shares its own sovereignty. It must be noted, furthermore, that "the sovereign people implies the destruction of sovereignty as a relation between ruler and ruled" (Shklar, 168).

Each individual thus becomes his own ruler and the ruler of all. The rule which the individual imposes on himself is accepted in a voluntary fashion and, therefore, perceived as non-restrictive. Voluntary self-rule furthers the necessary equality which must be established among group members as an essential prerequisite for the viability of the general will as a sovereign force. In other words, for the people to be sovereign, to govern itself and thus achieve its identity as a truly free social construct, each individual must freely accept the "chains" which guarantee that freedom. This conclusion confirms, once more, the paradoxical nature of the dynamism between individual and group.

In organizational terms I might refer to this conceptualization of the sovereign as the result of a bottom-to-top-to-bottom procedure. The individual citizen, at the bottom, may express his opinions in the spirit of the common good individually, i.e., freely within the context of society. The resulting consensus of all opinions reached by the entirety of the imaginary being, the State, then represents the general will, which subsequently applies
to every constituent of this body.

Although the private individual may procedurally disagree with
the general will, the individual citizen ultimately may not. It is
essential for the good of the citizen that he submit himself to the
general will. In Rousseau's words, "...whoever refuses to obey the
general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body; which
means nothing else than that he shall be forced to be free." (22)
While this statement may seem paradoxical, Rousseau's argument is
logical within the context of his model. Obeying the general will
frees the citizen from the obligations he must doubtlessly assume
as an individual who is dependent on interaction with other
individuals and groups. Paradoxically, a given individual's
disagreement with the general will would thus negate his own
prospects for individuality.

This kind of individualism, according to Rousseau's social
model, is a belief thus based on the obedience of the individual to
the general will as an expression not only of the common well-
being, but also of the individual good, or of the individual's
consent to seek the common interest. Jules Steinberg argues that
Rousseau describes the general will as an individual will, and that
"a community genuinely embodying a general will will be one in
which each individual citizen seeks to promote the common good,...
voluntarily subordinating the pursuit of private interest when so
engaged" (85). Establishing an individual identity under the
governance of a general-will principle would thus depend on the
willingness of the individual to accept the sovereign precepts as his foremost priority. However, individualism would be an inchoate and even naive concept if defined simply as freedom from personal, individual decision-making through adherence to directives established by consensus. Consensual decisions may be wrong and, as such, destructive for the group as well as for its members. Therefore, in order to assure the well-being of the group and of the individuals who constitute it, the general will must be infallible within the boundaries of its sovereignty. "It [only] loses its natural rectitude," writes Rousseau, "when it tends to some individual and determinate object..." (33). Its infallibility is thus ensured as long as the general will remains the consensual and equal expression of all.

This also implies that the general will remains infallible only in the context of the society which it governs. The common good of the constituents of one group may not apply to another group. The general will thus determines the particular characteristics of the group it governs and, consequently, may be understood as an agent of differentiation between the group components of a larger social construct. While the attributes of the general will may vary according to the "social territory" in which it is sovereign, Rousseau defines one consistent characteristic of the concept when stating that "it is contrary to the nature of the body politic for the sovereign to impose on itself a law which it cannot transgress" (20).
Such a law, as expressed by the general will, applies to each citizen equally, as well as to the sovereign governing the citizens. "Rousseau," comments Steinberg "attempts to instruct us in the creation of the kind of state in which each citizen obeys only his own will when obeying the law and thus is not deprived of personal freedom when obeying the law" (84). Obedience to the law then becomes a key feature of Rousseau’s social construct. "Rousseau shared with modern individualist thinkers the conviction that all political life is conventional, and that it can be made obligatory only through voluntary, individual consent," comments Patrick Riley. (241) Obedience to the law as an expression of the general will, therefore, becomes a statement of individualism and an assurance of the survival of the individual within the constraints of the group.

The complex nature of the law must be such that it encompasses the freedom of transgression without altering the provisionally infallible status of the sovereign. The general will is bound, therefore, first by the common good, and by extension, by the individual good as well. Since individual and common good are the primary interests of both constituents and group, the general will can only prove beneficial to both. Any expression of the sovereign is thus infallible in the context of the group it governs. "The general will," according to Rousseau," is always right and tends to the public advantage." (30) It only loses its infallibility in interaction with other groups where it assumes the status of just
another individual. Thus, in accordance with Rousseau's ideas, the individual general will of each group, although infallible within the constraints of that group, would nevertheless have to submit entirely in a multi-group organization, in order to permit the establishment of a higher-order sovereign, which in turn would gain infallibility and hence become beneficial to all constituent groups and the individuals who compose them.

As an infallible concept, the general will represents an instrument which assures the survival of the individual in society. The paradoxical nature of this process, however, emerges in the philosopher's procedural requirement that the individual abandon all his rights to the will of the community in order to be endowed by that community with these same individual rights. The individual, therefore, undergoes a transformation in which the dynamic element manifests the general will. Although the product of this transformation has many basic characteristics in common with the original, it differs in one essential aspect: it now becomes constituted as a part of a group. Rousseau's acceptance of the inevitability of social evolution resulted in the design of this different kind of individualism, constrained perhaps by the existence of society, but endowed nonetheless with individual freedoms that can only exist in society.
Sigmund Freud’s research into the different natures of the individual and the group, in this text dating from 1921, focuses on the changes that occur within the psychological make-up of the individual as he or she becomes a member of a group. The psychologist’s analysis not only reveals the probable causes and effects of that process for the individual, but also enables him to describe certain general characteristics of the group.

Although Freud draws profound distinctions between the individual and the group, he nevertheless acknowledges the fact that both exert an inevitable attraction on each other. A natural consequence of this acceptance would be then to concentrate the analysis on those characteristics of the individual which fall outside of his generally researched and accepted profile. In other words, since individual psychology concentrates on the study of the behavior exhibited by the individual to satisfy his personal instincts, group psychology should be concerned with the specific
behavioral conduct displayed by the group member in order to satisfy the demands of the group.

The individual within a group is subjected to the influence of other group members, i.e., he experiences a different kind of psychological intensity not directed toward the satisfaction of his own personal instincts. The group's set of values is not that of the individual; moreover, since a group is not a "natural" phenomenon, but rather an organization formed by human beings, its goals are to a certain degree artificial. The group members' behavior is consequently not comparable to that of a free individual.

For Freud, the individual member of a group must therefore develop a "special instinct" to behave in accordance with the requirements of the group. By comparing individual with group behavior, Freud discerns within the psychological profile of the group member a social instinct, referred to as "herd instinct," which constitutes in the words of the psychologist the "group mind." (170) This "herd instinct" is not a natural or "primitive" part of the individual's psychological make-up, although it might be traceable to the small original groups such as the family. Freud's analysis thus concentrates on exposing the features of this special instinct by examining its causes and effects in human cultures.

Rather than considering the specific characteristics of various societal entities, Freud attempts to describe the
attributes of those groups in the terms of the established nomenclature of individual psychology; he also researches the reasons for the apparent influence exercised by the group over the individual, and the effects on the individual by the group. As a starting point, Freud uses two prominent descriptions of the group: the first given by Gustave Le Bon in *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (1920), and the second by William McDougall in *The Group Mind* (1920). Although McDougall’s approach reflects a certain optimism with respect to the qualitative values of the group, Freud seems more inclined toward Le Bon’s negative portrayal.

Among other negative characteristics, Gustave Le Bon describes the group mind as being credulous and open to influence, having very limited critical abilities, and avid of authority. Freud justifies these characteristics by looking at the psychological changes that occur within the individual as he evolves in his role of social animal.

As a living collective organism, the group always expresses its feelings in a basic manner, affirms Le Bon. The group tends to exaggerate its feelings and is unable to differentiate between extremes. Therefore, doubt becomes certainty, since the group will not accept uncertainty, and antipathy becomes hatred, since it cannot express "shades of gray." However, if one accepts Le Bon’s characterization, love also will be carried to an extreme by the group. Freud’s analysis shows indeed that love, in its most general sense, as well as hate and weakness, plays a crucial role in the
relationship between individual and group.

Group morals, according to Le Bon, are based on the "cruel, brutal, and destructive instincts" which the group members strive to satisfy, but which they suppress as individuals. (173) The group would thus effectively negate the natural inhibitions of its members to satisfy its own instincts. Although Le Bon seems to indicate that those instincts are generally base, he admits that under certain conditions the group is capable of high achievements, such as unselfishness and devotion to its ideals. Heinz Kohut contends that the ambitions and ideals of a group ensure its continuity and, more importantly perhaps, its most important actions. (n. 1, 42) Such conditions, however, exist only when a group is being influenced in a positive way.

A group can be influenced through exaggeration and repetition, claims Le Bon. (Freud 172) The historical truth of this can be observed, for instance, in the workings of Nazi propaganda, as well as in the impact of advertising on today's world. Joseph Goebbels, the propaganda minister of the Third Reich, is reported to have stated that a lie, if repeated often enough, will turn into the truth. Exaggeration permits the reduction of a complex decision-making process to a single-solution procedure devoid of ambiguity. Since the rejection of ambiguity is an accepted principle of group behavior, it is evident that a group will eagerly and without discrimination accept a lie as truth, as long as it meets the criteria of exaggeration and repetition. Modern advertising
practices often operate on the borders of ethical conduct, but more often succeed in convincing their target groups of the benefits of their products. This demonstrates that exaggeration and repetition are a powerful means to overcome a basic characteristic of the group, i.e., its conservative nature.

Conservatism is an essential feature of collective social entities. Once a group is formed it must establish traditions in order to survive. Consequently, the group will oppose attempts at innovation. From a socio-political point of view, innovation threatens the existence of the group because it is akin to revolution. Psychologically, however, innovation tends to interfere with the emotional ties established between the group members and their leader, as well as with those established among themselves. Freud's findings indicate that the group mind is largely based on this dual emotional relationship. Rejection of innovation naturally leads to intolerance. Groups are known for their aversion to behavior and ideas deviating from their own. Consequently, gender prejudice, religious persecution, and racism are but some of the effects of group conservatism and intolerance.

The narrowmindedness which characterizes group behavior results in a strong desire for authority, and therefore fosters obedience. It may appear masochistic to the individual to submit himself voluntarily to the limitations established by the group mind. However, since the group as such is incapable of critical reasoning and capable only of extreme feelings, it is logical for
it to submit itself to strong authority based on force. This situation becomes even more accepted as the group members recognize the superior strength of the collective.

Although the collective strength of the group is far superior to that of the single individual, its intelligence is far lower, according to Le Bon. Freud's analysis does not address this point specifically. However, because Freud confirms the moral and emotional discrepancies of the group mind, it stands to reason that the intellectual capacities of groups parallel their emotional and moral behavior. Since these seem to be comparable to those of primitive man, collective intelligence would appear to be similar to that of a pre-societal individual.

Because the critical faculties of the group mind seem to be non-existent, objective reality is of no importance to groups. Groups demand illusions and choose the unreal over the real, as they choose the untruth over the truth. Freud acknowledges the importance of myth to society in his speculative approach to the mechanism of leadership within the group. Leaders may be persons or ideas. The group members associate leadership with prestige. According to Freud, prestige therefore results in the paralysis of critical faculties as it exerts a hypnotic fascination upon the constituents of the group. (173)

Le Bon's characterization of the group, supported by Freud's findings, emphasizes the negative or violent aspects of the collective, although this also leads to the paradoxical conclusion
that a group is capable of the worst as well as of the best. One may also infer from this portrayal that the group has a predominantly negative effect on the individual. It appears that the group member allows those primal emotional and moral traits, which he inhibited during a transitional phase of evolution between primitive and pre-societal individual, to surface in order to satisfy the crude instincts of the group.

Kohut condenses the Freudian group theory as follows:

Group pressure diminishes individuality; it leads to a primitivization of the mental processes, in particular to a partial paralysis of the ego and to a lowering of resistances. The diminution of the influence of the ego is then followed by the cathartic expression of archaic (or at any rate undisguised) impulses, emotions, and ideation, i.e., by the revelation of material which is not accessible in normal circumstances. (421)

Since it seems to be impossible for an individual to exist outside the group, partly because of the "herd instinct" which draws him towards the group and partly because of the hostility displayed by the group toward outside elements, the individual's only alternative would consist of "making the best" of the situation. Freud, unlike Rousseau, does not appear to believe in the possibility of fundamental individuality (even of a different kind) within the group. Because of the interconnection between ego and group mind, only a group leader may be capable of experiencing a
certain degree of individual freedom.

These characteristics of the group (mind) apply primarily to the case of an unorganized group. McDougall states that the paradoxical behavior of the group, i.e., being capable of the worst but also the best, stems from its level of organization. Unorganized groups, such as the ones described by Le Bon seem to behave immaturely and "in the worst cases...like...a wild beast, rather than...human beings" (175).

However, whether the group is organized or not has little effect on the attraction it is able to exert on the individual. Freud concurs with McDougall's finding that the individual is drawn to the group in an almost hypnotic way, which he defines as "emotional contagion." The group provides the individual with an experience he cannot undergo elsewhere: intensified emotion. This pleasurable experience is intense enough, according to McDougall, to trigger the unconditional surrender of the individual to the group. Although this "social hallucinogenic" may indeed contribute largely to the fascinating appeal of the group, it is insufficient to explain the change that occurs within the psychological profile of the individual. Freud's analysis demonstrates this transformation as resulting from a kind of transvasing, occurring between the individual's ego and ego ideal, as he is transformed into a group constituent. McDougall's "emotional contagion" may thus be regarded as a triggering device for the alteration of the individual and a cornerstone in the formation of a group.
It appears then that the individual who has no choice but to join a group must undergo a process of change, which is always detrimental to both his identity and his behavior as an individual. Furthermore, the individual's survivability, as a lesser being, now depends on the larger survivability of the group. Freud's paradox can thus be stated as follows: the survivability of a group as the sole guarantee for the survival of its constituents, is contingent on the evolutionary regression of those same constituents.

Once a group is formed, its survivability depends on its level of organization. In the first place, group members must be consciously aware of the group's nature, functions, and capacities in order to develop strong emotional ties with the group mind. Group continuity results from the development of traditions, customs, and habits which reflect the values of its constituents. A group structure must exist which provides and assigns specialized individual functions to the members. Finally, groups must interact and compete with other similar but different organizations. Groups organized along these guidelines exhibit traits which are far superior to those of unorganized collectives, according to McDougall.

Improved group performance would thus seem to result from organization. While McDougall affirms that psychological disadvantages and low collective intellectual performance are remedied through organization, Freud indicates that group improvement is a function of the transferring of individual values.
and features to the group. "The aim," declares the psychoanalyst, "is to equip the group with the attributes of the individual." (176) Therefore, the group must undergo a transformation in order to improve itself and, consequently, the psychological make-up of its constituents.

Improving the group depends thus on increasing its level of civilization, morality, and ethical behavior. In essence, the group must be humanized. Theoretically speaking, such humanization would allow the group to become psychologically mature, emotionally differentiated, and morally critical. Psychological maturity would result in the suppression of primitive instincts; emotional differentiation would permit a full range of feelings and reactions; moral criticism would allow the group to discern between good and bad, and to structure itself and its behavior accordingly. However, the question remains: how might a group be humanized?

In accordance with Freud's statement that the group's level of humanization is contingent on the "transfer" of individual values to the group mind, raising the basic membership requirements may be one such means of improvement. The coherence of a group depends on the common ideals of its constituents. If those ideals are formulated at a high level, in comparison with individual standards, and further accepted by the members, then the overall performance of the group should be equivalent to that of the individual constituents. However, setting high standards for a group would have to occur quasi naturally during the formation of
that group itself.

It seems logical that individuals whose ideals, perceptions, and interests coincide to a certain degree would be naturally inclined to form a group. If group values and membership criteria are established and recognized during the period of formation, those individuals accepting them would join deliberately, while those who disagree would abstain before the group is formed. Once the group is established it will then act in accordance with its basic criteria, which were previously agreed upon by the individual constituents.

Raising the values of a group after its formation appears to me to be very difficult, if not impossible. Individuals join a group for the compatibility they perceive between their ideals and those of the group. When a member loses faith in the group’s goals, he will leave that group either voluntarily or involuntarily. Incompatibility with the group’s ideals necessarily engenders non-compliance with group requirements. Hence, the dissenting individual, if he does not leave the group voluntarily, will eventually be ostracized by the other constituents. Raising (or lowering, for that matter) the basic values of the collective would entail incompatibility between the group and its constituents, unless such action is based on consensus. Reaching consensus, especially on raising expectations, seems to be an improbable option in groups. Setting group values should therefore be considered during the formation of the group in order to ensure its
coherence and survivability.

To Freud, such features depend on the love of the individual for the group and the emotional ties established in that way. These, according to the psychologist, constitute the essence of the group mind. (178) Love relationships do not only exist between the individual and the group, as such, but also between that individual and the other constituents. Love, in this context, is to be understood in its broadest meaning, i.e., including love for humanity, as well as for "concrete objects" and "abstract ideas." (177)

Since the group projects emotional ties onto its constituents, these become more intense if the members can identify a leader (or even a leading idea) within the group. Freud chooses to analyze groups from the point of view of their leadership, existent or non-existent, rather than in accordance with their degree of organization. According to the psychoanalyst, all kinds of groups, natural and artificial, require an "external force to keep them together." (178) In shaping his research along those lines, Freud arrives at a picture of the group quite consistent with Le Bon's. Thus, by examining the relationships of the individuals to and within the group and the leadership characteristics of the latter, Freud appears to come to the conclusion that the individual is diminished as he changes into a group member.

The problem now is to determine the nature of this diminution or degradation, and the ways in which it occurs. Using two
artificial groups as his models (the Catholic Church and the Army), Freud concludes that the individual may experience what he terms "libidinal cathexis" when his ties to the group leader or idea are severed, or when the group, as a collective, is exposed to unusual danger. (180) The double ties which exist between group constituents and their leader, as well as among themselves, constitute the backbone of the group. The rejection of a group member by his leader, i.e. the "father surrogate," results in his rejection by the group as well. The common ties which exist between the constituents are based on their collective adoration for the group leader. Should the latter reject one individual, the others would most certainly follow the lead. Harsh treatment, such as the abuse of power, therefore contributes to the possible disintegration of the group. In order to avoid libidinal cathexis, the individual must accept certain limitations, i.e., change his personality to fit the group mind. These limitations, according to Freud, include the acceptance of other group members as equals sharing the leader's love. Consequently, the personality change which the individual must undergo engenders a lowering of his individuality, freedom of choice, and decision-making faculties. It appears, however, that many are willing to trade their sense of individuality for the security and emotional support of a group.

While a group is capable of providing safety and protection to its members, it may be exposed to danger from the outside. As danger to the collective increases libidinal ties are strained and
panic may ensue. Group panic would thus represent another proof for the existence of the double emotional ties within a group. Furthermore, this extreme social emotion, born from the collective effort (resulting from these libidinal affective ties) to defend the group, paradoxically provokes its destruction. Thus, flawed relationships among group members (especially constituent vs. leader) and abnormal relationships among groups are the two major causes for the disintegration of the group as a general concept.

Freud's analysis of particular kinds of groups, such as the Church and the Army, reveals their specific characteristics and, consequently, the differences between them. Functionally different groups require their members to behave in different ways. While both Church and Army have a similar organizational structure, their members are expected to form different ties with the leadership of those groups. Both require members to establish emotional ties with the "father figures" (priests or sergeants, pope or commander-in-chief); however, the Church condones and encourages a certain identification of the members with the Church leader, in this case Jesus Christ. Although most church members are aware of the fact that they cannot realize a complete identification with the ideal personification of God, their aspirations may satisfy the demands of their "ego ideal." On the other hand, a soldier identifying with his superior would not only transgress basic military rules, but appear ridiculous in the eyes of his equals. The satisfaction of the soldier's ego ideal may depend on rote mimesis, or obedient
imitation, rather than identification.

For Freud, the ego and ego ideal are those elements of the individual's psychological constitution which are most influenced by his transformation into a group member. His definitions indicate that the ego ideal is the individual's ideal perception of himself. In many cases, an individual may not be able to realize that perfect person. Group membership then becomes a means of satisfying some, if not most of the demands that the individual's ego ideal imposes upon him. Through the process of identification with the group ideal, the individual may realize some of his own ideals. There would thus be a transference of individual values to group values. This transference raises the problem of conscious and/or unconscious misinterpretation by the individual of group ideals, but more importantly, it indicates that a group member's ego is disadvantaged as compared to his ego ideal. The libidinal relationship between group member and group ideal/leadership thus facilitates the identification process, which then results in the preferential treatment of the ego ideal and the neglect of the ego. Freud thus arrives at the conclusion that a group is "a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal," and that the group constituents have "consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego..." (193).

The neglect of the individual ego resulting from group relationships is thus another indication of the detrimental influence the group exerts on its members. Freud, by these
findings, explains Le Bon's observations concerning the negative influence of group membership. While the ego may suffer, however, the ego ideal appears to flourish. If one considers that the advantage may exceed the disadvantage, one conclusion would necessarily suggest that the group influence is beneficial rather than detrimental. However, considering that individual ideals are replaced, to a large extent, by those of the group, Freud's reader's conclusion must remain that a person's individuality deteriorates as he or she joins a group.

Freud's findings indicate that this deterioration, however, is not an inevitable nor total result. Under certain conditions, an individual may profit from joining a group. However, the individual's psychological profile must be flawed for this to occur. Freud indicates that neurotic individuals would be rejected by groups; however, he also finds that "where a powerful impetus has been given to group formation neuroses may diminish..." (208) This paradox can be explained if one examines Freud's definition of "neurosis." Essentially, neurotic behavior results from an individual's efforts to attain his ego ideal by accepting a lie for reality. Such an individual tends to accept his wishes as reality rather than to act upon achieving his goals. The group is much more likely to reach its goals as a result of the collective effort. If the collective goals coincide with those of the neurotic individual, and if the group accepts that individual as a member, then the influence of the group may have therapeutic value. This
may explain the relative success of associations such as Alcoholics Anonymous. Freud’s analysis may therefore allow us to conclude that while groups tend to exert a negative influence on the individual, they may be beneficial to those whose psychological make-up differs from the average.

Another negative aspect of the group is revealed when Freud explains the kind of steps taken by individuals who strive for leadership within a group. According to the psychoanalyst, the original leader (father surrogate) must be denigrated, turned into a "totemistic monster" slain by the "hero" who wants to assume leadership. (203) The new leader must then convince the group of his superior leadership qualities, for the group to remain in existence. This is achieved through what Freud terms "the heroic myth," a disguising of "the truth with lies in accordance with [the new leader’s] longing" (203). The psychoanalyst then concludes that myth is the process by which individuality can be achieved within a group. (204) Group leaders, being the objects of idealization, would thus be able to enjoy individual freedom as a result of their conscious manipulations of their credulous followers. Since leadership changes are common in groups, however, it must also be assumed that they do accept myth for reality; this brings us back to Le Bon’s characterization concerning the eagerness of groups for the unreal and their rejection of reality. However, Freud’s explanation of this negative group behavior seems to be based on conjecture rather than clinical observation.
Through clinical observation the psychoanalyst has found explanations for the behavioral changes undergone by the individual who becomes a group member, as well as for the generally negative influences of the collective on the individual. By doing so, Freud confirms Le Bon's perceptions to a large extent. He associates the limited critical abilities, the openness to influence, the credulity, and the avidity for authority, all described by Le Bon, to the fascination of the group members with its leadership and the association of leadership and prestige made by the constituents. The low moral standards of groups, along with their tendency toward exaggerated or extreme expressions of crude collective feelings, stem from the fact that they are situated on a lower evolutionary level than the individual. The individual group member will act according to these primitive standards and, therefore, be degraded in his individuality. Such degradation can be found in the fact that the group constituent tends to disregard the needs of his ego to satisfy those of his ego ideal, which he projects upon and even identifies with the values of the group. While Freud explains the negative attributes of groups based on observation and in psychological terms, he appears to be less specific and more speculative when he deals with the positive ones. The psychoanalyst's comments on the possible improvement of group behavior are limited to his recommendation to transfer individual values to the group. Freud's evaluation of McDougall's model (see pages 24-25) leads him to define group improvement as "the problem
[that] consists in how to procure for the group precisely those features which were characteristic of the individual..." (176).

A general conclusion that may be drawn from this interpretation of Freud's essay is that the individual will suffer psychologically from joining any group. The group's influence is such that it dictates its behavioral requirements to its members, who consciously and unconsciously must act in accordance with those requirements. In other words, the individual must accept limitations to his values and, consequently, to his status. As a group member, that individual is thus changed into a lesser version of himself, morally, emotionally, and intellectually.

The individual's survival within the group is nonetheless related to the values of the collective. If the group behaves in a fashion comparable to that of the individual, the latter's identity will be affected, although possibly to a negligible extent. Changing, i.e., improving group behavior thus becomes the key for the survival of individuality. However, the transposition of individual values into group values does not appear to be an appropriate mechanism of change.

If individual values are to replace those of the group, then the group must have a mechanism allowing it to recognize and accept external influence. Internal influence can only be exerted by group members who must accept existing group values for the group to survive. Group members would thus seem to be incapable of structurally changing collective behavior. On the other hand,
modeling group behavior on a set of ideal concepts is probably a futile effort, since neither the group nor its members need to change their ways, as long as the group is successfully surviving. A need for betterment may arise, however, when the group’s behavior becomes a cause for poor performance in its competition with others. At this moment, the group will be able to compare its collective behavior to that of its competitors, whether they are other groups or individuals.

The motivation for change would thus result from the comparative performance of a group in a larger system. The impetus for change derives logically from the group’s leadership who are aware of other groups. However, if that leadership is the result of a democratic election, i.e., composed of members of the group itself, the change required to ensure the survival of the group is likely not to take place. Paradoxically, in order for the leaders to be able to induce change, their values must be different from those of the group constituents, and by extension, for those of the group as a whole. Leaders who emerge from the constituency most likely possess the qualities of that constituency. Thus, in order to change group behavior, the leadership ought to be changed, and replaced by external agents. The loyalty required to support such an individual as a leader, however, may be hard to gain or maintain.

Since external factors seem to be the primary cause which could motivate a group to change its behavior, they necessarily
play a role in the selection and maintenance of any group's leadership. Clearly, it is not necessary for the external agent to assume actual leadership. External influences, ideas and actions, may be influential enough to bring about a collective transformation. Such influences necessarily enrich the group's psychology, since they represent points of views and behavior which differ from its own. In general, as the group is submitted to more external influence, its behavior becomes more differentiated and, consequently, evolves to a higher level. Improvement of group behavior would thus be a result of a dynamic process of evolution of the group among its competition.

For Freud, then, the group represents a framework within which the individual must exist in a state of limited individuality. Unlike Rousseau, who claims that man may survive in society by expressing his individual will in terms of the general will of that society, Freud seems to conclude that man must submit himself to the will of the group expressed by its lowest denominator.
Among all modern groups, and especially in the industrialized countries, the working environment may be the most influential setting with regard to the individual. Not only does it have a direct impact on the working person, but it also affects any and all of those who are related to the worker in one way or another. Thus, in industrialized societies, the work place shapes both individual and family behavior to a great extent.

In an essentially capitalist world, the goal of any work group is to acquire power through money. The competition between companies in a similar market place ensures the constant growth of productivity of that industrial sector. In order to survive as a group within such a competitive environment, business entities must adopt behaviors geared toward success, i.e., they will strive to be the most productive among their peer groups. Productivity (and the
methods to increase it) is the essence of Frederick Winslow Taylor's "Scientific Management."

Taylor describes productivity as the "initiative" potential of the workers. He defines "initiative" as "hard work, good-will, and... ingenuity." (36) His determination to design a system that might increase productivity stems from his scrutiny of the state of contemporary industry. Taylor found that the professional, traditionally transmitted knowledge of the workers was a mystery to most managers, and thus a major asset for the "doers." Management's only solution to the problem of informed workers who "...deliberately work as slowly as they dare..." was a system of incentives. (33-34) However, despite promotions, better working environments, and shorter working hours, management, according to Taylor was unable to optimize worker productivity. "Scientific management" was to be the perfect tool to unfreeze this unproductive status quo, and to induce the dynamic change required to take productivity to new heights.

To achieve this goal, the organizational structure of the work place must be remodeled. "Scientific management" requires the transfer of professional knowledge to management, as well as the transformation of individual work into standardized tasks. Taylor describes the new functions of management as follows:

The managers assume [under scientific management] the burden of gathering together all of the traditional knowledge which in the past has been possessed by the
workmen and then of classifying, tabulating, and reducing this knowledge to rules, laws, and formulae which are immensely helpful to the workmen in doing their daily work. (36)

He further defines the new managerial tasks as the selection, training, and development of the worker, and as an obligation to "heartily cooperate with the men..." (36). This new corporate behavior, according to Taylor, then leads to an equal division of work.

Taylor thus makes a rhetorical attempt to demonstrate that management takes on an additional burden to relieve the workers of the overwhelming task of taking responsibility for their work. "...even if the worker was well suited to the development and use of scientific data," writes Taylor in what I consider a condescending tone, "it would be physically impossible for him to work at his machine and at a desk at the same time" (36). Contrary, perhaps, to the popular interpretation, "scientific management" does not necessarily consist in a redistribution of knowledge, authority, and responsibility in favor of management. Rather, it promotes a coming together of "thinkers" and "doers" sharing equally in a common effort to optimize productivity.

The implementation of "scientific management" in the workplace requires not only the transformation of the basic structures of the business environment, but also some change in the ways individual workers perform their tasks. More importantly, it also
decrees a change in management philosophy. While Taylor’s methods, applied to the industrial environment, are conducive to increased productivity, they might also tend to influence the individual workers in a negative manner. Although the controversy surrounding the "father of scientific management" is not the object of this paper, it becomes understandable as we examine Taylor’s paradoxical approach to change in the work place in light of our preceding discussion of Rousseau and Freud.

Taylor’s "scientific management" is aimed at achieving the highest possible productivity in an industrial setting. In order to reach this goal, work functions are reduced to their simplest form, and methods are designed to perform those functions in an optimal way. Once these methods have been tested and approved, they become integral parts of the overall organizational system. "Scientific management" thus requires changing the system itself, rather than addressing specific problems and needs within the organization.

Taylor’s approach to management is thus system-based and consequently disregards the individuals who compose the system. The interactions of individuals and group are subjected to a relatively rigid set of rules and regulations governing work functions. It appears then, that "scientific management" is an impersonal approach that requires human beings to execute systemic orders for the sake of productivity. However, Taylor’s "scientific management" is not just a conglomerate of time and motion studies, ergonomics, and efficiency devices. Taylor rejects any definitions of
"scientific management" along those lines as misinterpretations.

The following definition was given by F. W. Taylor during an investigation conducted by a Congressional Committee:

Now, in its essence, scientific management involves a complete mental revolution on the part of the workingman engaged in any particular establishment or industry—a complete mental revolution on the part of these men as to their duties toward their work, toward their fellow men, and toward their employers. And it involves the equally complete mental revolution on the part of those on the management's side—the foreman, the superintendent, the owner of the business, the board of directors—a complete mental revolution on their part as to their duties toward their fellow workers in the management, toward their workmen, and toward all of their daily problems. And without this complete mental revolution on both sides scientific management does not exist. (27, emphasis added)

Thus, workers and managers alike must undergo significant behavioral change in order for "scientific management" to be effective. This approach demonstrates once more that Taylor's primary efforts are directed toward system efficiency, and that the work place constituents, (i.e., individuals) must adapt to the system requirements. The system thus takes precedence over the human factor.
Taylor's requirements put forth in his definition of "scientific management" are likely to inflict stress on the pre-existing relationships between the individuals and the group, as well as on the relationships between group constituents. The "complete mental revolution" which group members have to undergo may be interpreted as having to adopt a new vision of work itself, i.e., of all the values connected with a person's professional behavior. In essence, human behavior under "scientific management" is reduced to a mechanical effort to satisfy organizational needs stemming from the competitive environment in which the group must survive.

The only apparent incentive for this mechanical effort seems to be monetary. As production increases, profits increase. Higher profits result in higher wages and greater satisfaction of business owners. Whether financial incentives are sufficient to compensate for the loss of individuality, pride in workmanship, and the disappearance of social interaction within the group, however, is doubtful.

The reduction of work into the simplest functions that can be performed interchangeably by many trained and untrained persons results, in my opinion, in a "systemic" loss of individuality. Taylor's approach, unlike Freud's, seems to lack psychological insight into human nature and, unlike Rousseau's, appears to disregard philosophical considerations concerning the undeniable social bond which constitutes the fabric of any group. "Scientific
management" divides the working population into thinkers and doers, attaching prestige to the former and stigma to the latter. It creates a gap between a small elite of experts and a majority of unquestioning performers. While Taylor contends that an efficient system must be based on work functions reduced to the lowest common denominator and thus requiring minimal skills, he does not seem to realize that this approach is an insult to the intelligence of anyone required to work under those conditions. Clearly, one logical consequence of "scientific management" is that those who are forced (in order to meet their most basic physiological needs) to perform tasks which require only the adherence to an impersonal set of prescribed movements will eventually regard their work, and hence themselves, as nothing more than an anonymous element of an artifice, a "cog in the machine." Taylor's "mental revolution" applied to the individual, may thus be nothing more than a requirement to surrender individuality utterly and completely. According to this reasoning, the group, as a composite of individuals, is likely to become anonymous as well. The survival of the group would be contingent on the functional efficiency of its governing system. If such a system became universal, the end product of the free market system would simply be productivity. Competition on that level would negate innovation and quality which, in my opinion, are essential driving forces of the market.

Taylor's "mental revolution" appears then to be detrimental to individuals at all levels of the organizational hierarchy, and to
have a negative effect on group identity. It is this identity which holds the group together, and thus makes it effective. However, in a world of anonymous competing systems, functional group members are interchangeable. Besides making such terms as "belonging" and "duty" obsolete, such a world is likely to experience no emotions or ethical concerns with regard to its constituents. In essence, its existence is warranted solely as a mechanical money-making machine.

Taylor himself may have experienced some doubts regarding the impersonal, mechanizing tendencies of his managerial theory. In *Shop Management* he concedes that "no system of management...should be applied in a wooden way" (184). By advocating relations between workers and management based on esteem and trust, Taylor may have wanted to humanize "scientific management," although an ulterior motive could be to find ways to avoid friction between the two groups, and therefore, to increase productivity.

Whether recognizing the human factor as an essential component of "scientific management" would actually soften its impact on individual and group, is debatable. While civilized behavior - however determined by workers and management - will contribute to the enhancement of the working environment, it may also violate the basic principles of "scientific management." This managerial theory appears to have the single objective of increasing productivity and hence profits. Although producing higher wages may be interpreted as a "humanizing" feature of "scientific management," it is
essentially a result of an emotionally and socially sterile system in which human behavior, whether constructive or destructive, has no place.

In The Principles of Scientific Management, Taylor describes some aspects of human behavior which are admissible. "Scientific management" requires the following:

- Science, not rule of thumb.
- Harmony, not discord.
- Cooperation, not individualism.
- Maximum output, in place of restricted output.
- The development of each man to his greatest efficiency and prosperity. (140)

Although these principles appear to stress the need for constructive interaction between group members and group values, they may also be interpreted as basic system requirements. It is significant in this context to note the juxtaposition of "cooperation" and "individualism" as opposites. Cooperation results from the consensual efforts of individuals in attaining a mutual goal. Since "scientific management" defines the organizational goals, the "cooperation" mentioned in these principles appears to refer to the individual’s submission to system requirements rather than a voluntary and constructive relationship among group constituents. "Scientific management" denies knowledge to the workers, yet expects them to strive for the achievement of the goals set by the system without questioning them. It expects a
group reaction triggered solely by the system and devoid of individual input. Positive cooperation cannot exist under those conditions; opposition is much more likely.

A constructive relationship among group members is then negated by the specific reference to "each man" in the last of the principles cited above. The message here seems to indicate that each worker is to be considered a single element in a mechanistic system. Each element must be designed to perform in accordance with the highest possible standards of efficiency in order to conform to the predetermined system performance. Adherence to comparative efficiency standards eliminates any deviations from the preset norms, and thus any individuality.

Standards and norms emerge as the fundamental essence of "scientific management." The remodeling of work into tasks requires the setting of performance levels and restrictions. The exact way of performing a task is described in all its detail, including the exact time allowed to execute its specific requirements. It seems obvious to this author that individuality cannot be a part of a theory which is limited to such numbers. While a scientific approach to productivity may be required to satisfy the demands of a capitalist work environment, it must make abstraction of the human factor. The science of numbers is in the minds of many the only exact one; individuality, in all its unpredictability, cannot be translated into numbers. F.W. Taylor, for that reason, cannot require a working group to adhere to the numbers on the one side,
and to human behavioral standards on the other. "Scientific management" as described by Taylor thus mixes concepts which are incompatible.

Based on these findings, the application of "scientific management" would result in the elimination of the individual, and hence the group. The monetary incentives of the system may be sufficient to satisfy the physiological requirements of the worker, i.e., the need for food, shelter, and clothing; however, individuals must be able (or at least have the choice) to address their needs for safety, love, and esteem, in order to reach, what Maslow calls, their potential of self-actualization. Without that possibility, the individual cannot develop his potential. Consequently, he cannot form, along with others, a group of human constituents.

"Scientific management," contrary to the approaches to group dynamics brought forth by Rousseau and Freud, appears to aim at the destruction of individuality. It seems to negate the importance of the social bond for the sake of productivity. In my opinion, an understanding of democratic values and human psychology, in combination with Taylor's scientific methods, might well result in levels of productivity "scientific management" could not attain. Taylor's work demonstrates the validity of my argument for a multi-disciplinary approach to overarching problems. "Scientific management," I truly believe, was developed in an honest attempt to tap into the vast, unused potential of the work place. However,
Taylor obviously did not anticipate the negative effects of his narrow approach. The practical result, then, is a partial, i.e., incomplete and, therefore, inefficient, solution to the problem at hand. As long as individuals are required to produce the goods demanded by their groups, "scientific management" will not be able to achieve its greatest potential and the work environment will remain under the influence of those who created it: individuals.
CONCLUSION

The three views discussed in this paper have one thing in common: they all recognize the importance of the concepts of "individual" and "group." It is hardly possible to develop, within this limited scope, a complete picture of these concepts. However, this discussion leads to the question of the identity of individuality.

The philosopher, the psychoanalyst, and the manager proceed from different understandings of individuality. Thus, individuals, themselves, interpret the concept in many different ways. One could simply conclude that individuality is what sets us apart from all others. However, such an interpretation does not take into consideration the complexity of the concept.

The individual has no choice but to accept the limitations imposed on him in today's society. It appears to me that he could not survive without the safety of the group, even if that safety seems precarious. The term "free spirit" has become a cliché and a paradox. The individual, in this context, can only be recognized in comparison to the group. This leads to the conclusion that individual and group are inseparable. Individuality thus becomes a basic characteristic of the group.

Furthermore, group behavior may be considered the most influential factor affecting individuality. An individual, born into a group, will at first mimic the behavior of the other group.
constituents. As he evolves within the group, he will tend to assume its values and behaviors through this process of mimesis, not conscious learning. However, there appears to be a point in the evolution of the individual where he develops critical faculties which will determine his further development.

In order to develop critical faculties, the individual has at his disposition two distinct sets of information: the readily available one provided by his group, and the more comprehensive one which exists outside of the boundaries of his group. Although there exist relatively closed and isolated groups in today's society, most seem to be open and willing to interact at least on an intellectual level with others. The individual's ability and willingness to interpret his knowledge obtained from both worlds determine his degree of individuality.

For many, this process of interpretation results in the making of choices. Remaining with the original group, as well as joining a different one, become individual decisions. Since such decisions are made based upon the individual's sense of compatibility with the values and behaviors of any group, the latter, again, become the driving factors. The quality of "individuality" could thus be determined as a function of the individual's degree of intellectual freedom of choice and extent to which that choice depends on the feedback obtained from the sources of his interest.

Intellectual freedom of choice varies in accordance with the influence exerted by the group on each individual member. The
emotional ties, described by Sigmund Freud, vary in their intensity relative to each individual. The latter's decision to agree or disagree with his group's values may be influenced only marginally or, on the contrary, very largely by his emotional relationship with the group itself, and other group members. Although a group member's decisions remain individual ones in all circumstances, they nevertheless reflect the degree of influence exerted by the group. Individuality therefore is a conglomerate of individual and group characteristics.

The paradoxical nature of these findings is reflected in the writings of Rousseau, Freud, and Taylor. The philosopher indicates that in order to survive, the individual must first perish. The psychologist reasons that the group must change to assure the survival of the individual: however, the group must inevitably, even tragically, adopt the values of an ineluctably "reduced" individual. The manager requires the elimination of the individual in order to satisfy that individual's demands. Finally, individuality becomes a function of the group. "Individual" and "group" have no apparent value as stand-alone concepts. They only become meaningful when considered together. According to this study, while "individual" and "group" are two distinct but complementary concepts, their interaction appears to be fundamentally paradoxical: just as the concept of "individual" or the idea of "group" seems determined, its sense must diverge from that initial determination in order to achieve its fullest
elaboration. Whether this state of affairs functions productively or destructively, however, remains to be demonstrated in the human laboratory.
WORKS CONSULTED


HONORS SENIOR PROJECT APPROVAL FORM

(To be submitted by the student to the Honors Program with a copy of the Honors Project suitable for binding. All signatures must be obtained.)

Name of Candidate: Alex Tonus

Department: Foreign Languages and Literatures

Degree: BA French and International Trade

Full Title of Project: Individual, Group, and Paradox: Essentials of the Social Bond

Approved by:

Dr. James Winchell  
Project Advisor  11/27/95

Dr. Nielsen  
Department Chair  Sandra L. Nielsen  11-27-95

Dr. Joyce Pettis  
Honors Program Director for Honors Council  Joyce Pettis  11-27-95